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Lipanovich: Smoke Before Oil

COMMENT
SMOKE BEFORE OIL:
MODELING A SUIT AGAINST
THE AUTO AND OIL INDUSTRY

ON THE TOBACCO TORT
LITIGATION IS FEASIBLE
"If we can send humans to the moon and store encyclopedias'
worth of information on something the size of a coin, why
aren't we driving fuel-efficient vehicles that don't pollute?'"

INTRODUCTION

The petroleum industry (hereinafter "petro industry"),
from start to finish, pollutes the environment: Oil production
facilities spill and leak toxic chemicals, transport operations
have frequent accidents, and refineries discharge large
amounts of toxic by-products." Underground storage tanks leak
'Elizabeth Grossman, Moral Exhaustion, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2000, Book
World, at X06.
2 In this Comment, "petro industry" means manufacturers, distributors, and
producers of automobile fuel, diesel fuel, aircraft fuel, kerosene, and similar consumer
products and the machines which use them.
• Oil refineries are the largest stationary source of volatile organic compounds
("vOCs") in the U.S. MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T REFORM, 105TH
CONG., OIL REFINERIES FAIL TO REPORT MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF HARMFUL EMISSIONS i
(Comm. Print 1999). They are the "fourth largest industrial source of toxic emissions
and the single largest source of benzene pollution". [d. Their unreported leaks are the
nth largest source ofVOC emissions in the US, controlling this illegal pollution could
be done at minimal cost, and doing so would be the equivalent of removing 5 million
automobiles from the road. [d. at ii. Further, almost half of refmeries in America are
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gasoline constituents into the soil and drinking water supplies.'
Automobiles emit pollutants. These emissions are causing
health harms, smog, climate change, and a hole in the earth's
ozone. 5 Petroleum dependence is increasing the need for highways, which diminishes wildlife corridors. 6 These are just a few
of the international social and environmental harms associated
with the industry.7 The petro industry, comprising oil compalocated in "unattainment" areas -areas that fail to meet federal and state air pollution
standards. Id. at 6. In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's")
"Regulatory Impact Assessment for Petroleum Refineries" concluded that 4.5 million
people living within 30 miles of oil refineries are exposed to benzene concentrations in
excess of the Clean Air Act's acceptable risk threshold. CENTER FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES, CRUDE RECKONING: THE IMPACT OF
PETROLEUM ON CALIFORNIA'S PuBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT 32 (2000). The
American Petroleum Institute in 1994 concluded that 85% of all refineries in the U.S.
are the source of known groundwater contamination. Id. at 33. Oceans annually build
up approximately 1.47 million tons of oil from oil refinery discharges and transport
efforts according to a 2002 report by Harvard. Id.
• Approximately 38% of the 920,000 underground storage tanks ("USTs") in the
U.S. are leaking gasoline and its constituents in every part of the country. Small, Matthew, C., Should MTBE be Banned or Limited to 3% by Volume in Gasoline? Mineral
Engineering, U.C.
Berkley, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency at

http://petroleum.berkeley.edu/patzek/studentslsmall-research.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). Many scientists believe that one of the chemicals in these products
cannot even be contained in USTs: Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE"), a known
cause of leukemia in humans. Gregory Crofton, Geology experts believe MTBE cleanup
is adding to problem, Tahoe Daily Tribune, March 17, 2003, available at
http://www.tahoedailytribune.comlapps/p bcs.dlVarticle?Date=20030317&Category=NE
WS&ArtNo=303170106&Ref=AR (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); COMMUNITIES FOR A
BETTER ENVIRONMENT, CBE RESOLVES LAWSUIT AGAINST HALF OF CALIFORNIA OIL
COMPANIES
TO
REQUIRE
CLEAN-UP
OF
MTBE
(Aug.
20
2001),
at
http://www.cbecal.org/alerts/oil/oMTBE082001.shtml(lastvisitedFeb.2.2005).In
2002, a jury labeled MTBE as a defective product and found three companies in South
Lake Tahoe poisoned water supplies with MTBE, making thirty-four drinking wells
unusable. Seem Mehta, 3 Companies Liable in Tahoe MTBE Pollution, L. A. TIMES,
April 17, 2002, at B7. In Santa Monica, California by the time MTBE was discovered
in the city's drinking water wells 80% of the supply had been poisoned. Dan Morain,
California and the West; Boxer Will Ask EPA to Curb Gas Additive, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1997, at 3.
• The U.S. Department of Energy reports approximately 25 pounds of greenhouse
gases
are
emitted
per
gallon
of
gas.
Available
at
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txtlptb0512c.html, (last visited Aug. 22, 2002); Electronic
with
U.S.
Department of Energy fuel
economy department,
comm.
fueleconomy@ornl.gov (Aug. 22, 2003). In 2001, petroleum run engines in the U.S.
consumed 799,134,000 gallons of oil per day. Id. Thus, in 2001 in the U.S. the total
greenhouse gases produced by driving petroleum run vehicles was 19.978 billion tons
per day.
6 See, e.g., Katherine Shaver, Md. Alters Plan For Connector to Reduce Impacts;
2 Latest Opinions Presented as Being Less Disruptive, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2003, Metro
at B07.
7 See infra, notes 53-100. See also, State of Denial, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr.
27,2001, available at http://www.sacbee.comldenial (last visited on Feb. 6, 2005).
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nies, refmeries, engine manufacturers, vehicle manufacturers,
and the purveyors of related products and devices, makes and
markets products that release toxic chemicals not just at the
tailpipe or smokestack, but at every step in the production-toconsumption process. 8 The petro industry might be the largest
source of pollution on the planet, and yet it is unnecessary.
The successful legal movement in the 1990's against the
tobacco industry demonstrated that common-law torts can be
used effectively against manufacturers of widely disseminated
harmful products in order recover private and public expenditures. 9 The principles learned from the tobacco litigation may
be used to recoup private and public expenditures from the
petro industry for harm caused by use of their products. Six
years before 46 state attorneys general settled with the nation's four major tobacco companies for $206 billion, one commentator poignantly noted: "in an era of comparative fault, it
must be regarded as a remarkable feat that an industry
claimed to be responsible for the highest toll of premature
death in human history could withstand almost four decades of
litigation without paying a single adverse monetary award.»!o
Shortly thereafter, on the heels of two waves of lawsuits
against the tobacco industry, a state-led wave of tobacco litigation occurred nationwide. 11
Likewise, the petro industry has managed to pass billions
of dollars in environmental costs to the public, while successfully avoiding common-law tort liability. The net income of the
major U.S. petroleum companies from 1990 to 2001 was $318.2
billion, not including the mining, manufacturing, and trade
8 The U.S. EPA defines toxic substances as "chemicals or compounds that may
present an unreasonable threat to human health and the environment. Human expo·
sure to toxic substances can cause a variety of health effects, including damage to the
nervous system, reproductive and developmental problems, cancer, and genetic disorders." at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpageslpolltoxicsubstances.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2005).
9 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 15, California v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
CASE CITATION (No. 97AS03031), and State of Alaska v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.1
JU-97915 CL, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edultohaccollitigation/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2005).
10 ELIZABETH G. Hn..L, WHAT WILL IT MEAN FOR CALIFORNIA?
THE TOBACCO
SETTLEMENT 2-3 (1999); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 878 (1992).
11 Erin Myers, The Ward, Kershaw and Minton Environmental Symposium: 'Up
in Smoke: Coming to Terms with the Legacy of Tobacco,' 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y
79, 80 (1998).
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petroleum corporations. 12 In 1997, Americans paid $4 billion, or
$.05 per gallon of gasoline, in additional costs due to ozonerelated respiratory health problems, and up to tens of billions
of dollars, or $.59 per gallon of diesel, in additional costs due to
increased morbidity and premature mortality caused by particulates and acidic aerosols. 13
This Comment explores the viability of using the same legal theories employed in the 1990's tobacco litigation to hold
the petro industry accountable in California for some of the
harms caused by its products. Section I reviews the historical
framework and key events leading to the tobacco tort litigation's recovery of public expenses and attainment of industry
accountability. Section II describes some of the damages that
petro plaintiffs could allege in similar tort claims brought
against the petro industry and identifies public costs that petro
plaintiffs might be able to recover. In Section III the feasibility
of bringing petro tort claims in California against manufacturers of internal combustion engines (hereinafter "ICE") and petroleum fuel is explored. This Section analyzes the ability of
petro plaintiffs to establish standing and whether any federal
laws preempt their claims. This Section concludes that petro
plaintiffs could establish standing to bring either a products
liability or nuisance suit, and that their claims could survive
preemption challenges. This Section then explores the applicability of products liability law to petro pollution. In particular,
the element of causation is considered and found to be provable
under California law. The California tests for defective design
are also considered, including which test is appropriate for
petro litigation. This Section proposes that a strict liability
defective design claim against petroleum fuel and ICE manufacturers could be successful. Lastly, Section III explores the
applicability of public nuisance law to petro pollution. This
12 u.s. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, Doc. No.
891, at http://www.census.gov/prodl2003pubsl02statab/energy.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
13 JOHN L. MOORE ET AL., OIL IMPORTS: AN OVERVIEW AND UPDATE OF ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY EFFECTS, C.R.S. REP. 98-1, E.N.R. at Table A-I (1997), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreportslenergy/eng53.cfm?&CFID=6471470&CFTOKEN=24377660 (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); See also
STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGY:
VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 2 (1995) (stating health
benefits of reducing urban ozone concentrations, now estimated to cost $0.5 billion to
$4 billion per year).
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Section proposes that suits by both the California Attorney
General and private litigants alleging public nuisance against
petroleum fuel and ICE manufacturers and seeking to abate
health and environmental harms could obtain injunctive and
civil penalty relief.
I.

BACKGROUND -- HISTORY OF THE TOBACCO TORT
LITIGATION

The day after a California law shielding the tobacco industry from liability expired in 1997, California's Attorney General
filed suit against the American "tobacco industry."" Until that
point, the industry had successfully staved off lawsuits through
legal and non-legal defense tactics even in states without laws
exempting tobacco products from products liability. 15 The tobacco industry's main strategy was never to settle, while fighting back with its high-powered lawyers and inexhaustible financial resources. 16 Plaintiff smokers, as a result, commonly
lost due to financial bankruptcy.17 After the adoption of comment i of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, some courts opined
that its language exempted tobacco from products liability. IS
Some tobacco defendants successfully argued that no safer alI. The courts in both Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 50 P.3d 769, 770-771
(Cal. 2002), and Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 50 P.3d 751, 753 (Cal. 2002),
held that CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 shielded tobacco companies for a 10-year period
from 1987 until 1997, when the legislature amended it so the government could sue on
tobacco-related claims. California's suit, filed after the expiration of this statute, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., Case No. 97AS03031, is available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobaccollitigation/ca/ (last visited on Feb. 8, 2005). The
"tobacco industry" refers to the seven major tobacco companies involved in the 1998
settlement.
Office
of Attorney
General,
State
of California,
at
http://caag.state.ca.us/tobacco/index.htm (last visited on Feb. 8, 2005).
15 See Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 868.
16 Id. at 867-74; Rodney R. Moy, Review of Selected 1997 California Legislation:
Tobacco Companies, Immune No More-California's Removal of the Legal Barriers Preventing Plaintiffs from Recovering for Tobacco-Related Illness, 29 McGeorge L. Rev.
761, 764 (1998).
17 Id. at 867-74; Rodney R. Moy, supra note 16.
IS RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i., states that regarding strict
liability for defective products, "[tlhe article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics ...
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may
be harmful. .." See also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 487
(3d. Cir. 1965) (Freedman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 382 U.s. 987 (1966). (Pritchard
II). See also Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 863.
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ternative design existed and causation was unproven. 19 Before
juries, however, the defense's most powerful argument was always assumption of risk. Smokers assumed the risk by voluntarily choosing to smoke, and suing for self-imposed harm
lacked moral character!O The strength of the assumption-ofrisk defense defeated common-law theories of liability against
the tobacco industry since the Surgeon General's Report in
1964 first concluded that cigarette smoking is an immediate
health hazard. 21
Early in the 1990's, tobacco plaintiffs obtained the "smoking gun." Confidential industry files anonymously sent to a
San Diego law professor, and discovery documents obtained by
plaintiff's attorneys in Cipollone v. Liggett Group. Inc., provided evidence of "the tobacco industry's calculated and successful efforts [since] the 1930's to confuse the American public
and their doctors about the dangers of cigarette smoking.''''2
After not settling a claim in 35 years, the tobacco industry began settling and losing lawsuits. 23 Tobacco plaintiffs finally
could prove that tobacco products were defective products
without the industry successfully defending on the basis of assumption of risk, lack of causation, or lack of awareness'"
The "smoking gun" documents showed the tobacco industry purposely and secretly increased the addictive nature of
their products and targeted youth to create a lifetime of addiction:· In fact, long before the first warnings of the lethal dan19 See Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225(1st Cir. 1990), petition for
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1991) (No. 90-1473); Semowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-CV-118, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
18,1988).
20 Richard L. Cupp, Jr. A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud
and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 46667 (1998); See also Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 871.
21 See
Report
19890100,
RJ
Reynolds
archives,
at
http://www.rjrtdocs.comlrjtdocslsummary_displaywmt?z=l&search=O&stab=summary
(last visited on Oct. 23, 2004).
22 Supplement to Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Incriminating Cigarette Documents Released (Mar. 26, 1988) (on file with author). (from RJ Reynolds archives, Published Document 19880326); see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505
U.S. 504 (1992).
23 Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 874; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., supra note 20, at
465-467.
24 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., supra note 20, at 48l.
25 Supplement to Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Incriminating Cigarette Documents Released (Mar. 26, 1988) (on file with author). (from RJ Reynolds archives, Published Document 19880326.)
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gers of smoking appeared, the industry knew of the dangers
but failed to test their products or warn consumers.26 Moreover,
the industry could have designed their cigarettes to be less lethal, but refused to do SO.27 A "public relations smokescreen"
was designed to deceive consumers and give the appearance
that the industry was "testing and improving the safety of their
products."26 Furthermore, the industry actively conspired to
stifle public awareness about relevant scientific developments. 29
In one instance, a press release from a July 1962 circulation by
the Tobacco Industry Research Committee announced that a
scientist had given "28 reasons for his belief that the causal
relationship of cigarette smoking to lung cancer is certainly
unproved."·D The industry sent this press release not only to
members of Congress, but also to American doctors."! A confidential memo between lawyers of a prominent tobacco-defense
law firm warned that "the introduction of the purportedly
'safer' cigarette 'could immediately and significantly increase
<tobacco companies) exposure to liability for sales of conventional cigarettes.',,"2 Evidence from tobacco suits against Morris, Liggett, and Lorillard showed all three defendants either
made safer cigarettes or made substantial progress toward
their development as early as the 1960s, but chose not to sell
them."' The new evidence spurred State Attorneys General nationwide to bring suit against the tobacco industry."' They used
the same tort claims alleged for decades in unsuccessful tobacco litigation, such as negligent and intentional misrepresentation, products liability for defective design and failure to
warn, and nuisance theories.
In People of the State of California v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
California's Attorney General alleged that the defendant tobacco companies had "[p]laced on the market defective tobacco
Id.
Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
'" Id.
3! Id.
'}fj

27

32 Ed Bean, Memo Warns of Legal Risk of 'Smokeless' Cigarettes, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 1988.
33 Id.
34 Supplement to Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Incriminating Cigarette Documents Released (Mar. 26, 1988) (on file with author). (from RJ Reynolds archives, Published Document 19880326.)
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products, knowing that they would be used without inspection
for defect, which have caused injury to human beings, including many who were and are California Medi-Cal beneficiaries .
. . [their] products were defectively designed because their
products failed to perform as safely as an ordinary smoker or
user would expect when used in the intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner.'>35 The hidden addictive nature of their
products could now be established from the industry's own
statements, preventing the factfinder from concluding the
smokers foresaw and assumed the risk. 36 The industry actually
manipulated their product's design by increasing nicotine levels, thereby decreasing smokers' ability to control their exposure to the risk of harm. 37 The claim asserted the tobacco products were "[d]efectively designed because they contained excessive preventable dangers ... [and] the Defendant Tobacco Companies failed to redesign their products to reduce this health
risk, and in fact, frequently took steps to increase or enhance
this risk."36 This allegation was supported by evidence showing
cigarette manufacturers failed to warn consumers of the addictive power of tobacco and politically opposed all efforts to include this warning on federally mandated labels. 39 California
alleged that the products' design injured thousands of California consumers!O These injuries include addiction, lung cancer,
throat cancer, emphysema, heart disease, birth defects, and
death." The State concluded that it had a right to recover its
expenses under California's Welfare & Institutions Code since
the defendants' defective products directly and proximately

35 First Amended Complaint at 14, California v. Philip Morris, Inc. CASE
CITATION (No. 97AS03031).
36 Tobacco Products Liability Project, Ten Questions & Answers About Tobacco
Liability, 1-2 (on me with author) (explaining that since 60 to 90% of smokers are addicted and/or dependent on nicotine and most smokers have made attempts to break
their addiction but find themselves unable to stop and nicotine is more addictive than
heroin and far more available, and it is still socially accepted and highly promoted).
37 See id.
38 First Amended Complaint at 15, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE
CITATION (No. 97AS03031).
39 See Tobacco Products Liability Project, Ten Questions & Answers About Tobacco Liability, 2 (on file with author).
'" First Amended Complaint at 15, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE
CITATION (No. 97AS03031).
41

[d.
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injured California Medi-Cal beneficiaries!2 The State also alleged punitive damages were warranted based on the industry's moral depravity.'"
In a second cause of action, California alleged that since
1953, the tobacco companies conspired and agreed to unreasonably restrain the market for cigarettes and other tobacco
products in violation of the Cartwright Act, by limiting and
suppressing research and information that could have led to
product innovations.... This prevented the making of a safer
cigarette available to the consuming public and allowing other
manufacturers to lawfully compete in the market!5 The deprivation of the choice to buy a safer cigarette product buttressed
the claim for reimbursement of Medi-Cal expenses. It lowered
the degree of fault attributable to smokers for failing to choose
to buy less-harmful products. California joined its claim with
claims from 39 other states!6 While different states used
slightly different theories of liability, all included claims, like
California's, for Medicare reimbursement based on tort liability." The defendant manufacturers that had escaped paying a
cent for 35 years agreed to a $246 billion settlement!8 Thus it

42 Medi-Cal is a public medical care program funded 50:50 by the state and federal government. California, as the other states, was suing for its share. "When benefits are provided or will be provided to a beneficiary under this chapter because of an
injury for which another person is liable, ... the director [of the Department of Health
Services] shall have a right to recover from such person or carrier the reasonable value
of benefits so provided." CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 14124.71(a) (West 2001).
43 First Amended Complaint at 23, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE
CITATION (No. 97AS03031). The state was able to allege this because the majority of
smokers (80 to 90%) "began smoking and became addicted to nicotine as teenagers,
before the age of adult responsibility," and "addiction diminishes a person's ability to
choose freely and act wisely." Tobacco Products Liability Project, Ten Questions &
Answers About Tobacco Liability, 2 (on me with author).
44 First Amended Complaint at 17, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE
CITATION (No. 97AS03031); See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West
1997).
45 First Amended Complaint at 17, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE
CITATION (No. 97AS03031); See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West
1997).
46 Details of this nationwide lawsuit, including the resulting master settlement,
are available at http://www.library.ucsf.edultobacco/litigation/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2005).
47 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., supra note 20, at 468.
45 California's $14 billion share of the settlement is being used towards redressing the harms caused by industry practice that aggressively marketed defective products with disregard for their effects.
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was a case in which every defendant implicitly acknowledged
its potential liability.
Applicability of the same legal theories against other industries has not gone unnoticed. 49 As many commentators have
noted, "the tobacco litigation is a touchstone of tort law's expanding social and public policy role. "50 Such lawsuits are accomplishing in court what could not be achieved in the state
and federal legislative branches. 51 Moreover, the explosion of
the anti-tobacco action demonstrates the effectiveness of the
movement.52
The nexus for the next lawsuit could be the petro industry.
For instance, for over fifty years scientists and politicians have
known about the health and environmental harms caused by
use of gasoline, diesel fuel and related petrochemical products
(collectively "petroleum products"), yet their sale continues
without legal challenge. Petro industry products cause harm
that arguably dwarfs the harm caused by tobacco industry
products. A lawsuit against the petro industry to recover
medical reimbursement costs and environmental response
costs could bring the biggest settlement of all time.

II.

DISCUSSION -- DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE USE OF PETRO
PRODUCTS

Significant evidence exists that petro products are causing
substantial health costs, public costs, and environmental

4. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., "Beyond Tobacco Symposium: Tort Issues in Light of the
Cigarette Litigation: State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?" 27 Pepp. L. Rev.
685 (2000).
00 Michael L. Rustad, Srrwke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega
Social Policy Cases. 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 511-512 (2001); See also Edward Winter
Trapolin, Sued Into Submission: Judicial Creation of Standards in the Manufacture
and Distribution of Lawful Products-The New Orleans Lawsuit Against Gun Manufacturers, 46 Loy. L. Rev. 1275, 1279 (Winter, 2000).
" See generally MaviIia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983);
Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984);
Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985); see also
Lawrence Reed, Taxation by Litigation" Threatens Every American Business . . . Including Banks!, MICH. BANKER, June 1, 1999, at 84,; Dahleen Glanton, NRA, Firearms
Industry Work to Fight Cities' Suits, Cill. TruB., Feb. 4,1999, at 5.
52 See
Report
19890100,
RJ
Reynolds
archives,
available
at
http://www.rjrtdocs.comlrjtdocsisummary_displaywmt?z=1&search=0&stab=summary
(last visited on Oct. 23, 2004).
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costs. 53 Actual details concerning the practices and knowledge
of petro defendants regarding these harms would likely require
corporate research and discovery. However, the following
summary indicates that the kinds and breadth of damages
petro plaintiffs can claim may exceed those of tobacco tort
plaintiffs.
A

PuBLIC HEALTH HARMs

The health of American citizens is significantly harmed by
the major constituents of automobile exhaust, which have been
identified since 1922.54 In 1957, some members of Congress
were so concerned about the health effects of vehicle pollution
that a bill was introduced (although ultimately not passed) to
prohibit from U.S. roadways any motor vehicle that discharged
pollution in excess of levels found dangerous by the U.S. Surgeon General.65 Today, it is common knowledge that human
exposure to petroleum emissions trapped in a garage causes
death. Less known is that exposure to these emissions trapped
within the earth's atmospheric layers is causing not only early
death,sa but also cancer,s7 respiratory illness/s heart and blood
53 See infra notes 54-100 and accompanying text .
.. JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 20 (2000).
.. JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 23 (2000) .
.. D.W. Dockery, C.A. Pope III, Acute Respiratory Effects of Particulate Air Pollution, 15 Annual Review of Public Health 107 (1994), K. Katsouyanni, G. Touloumi, C.
Spix, et al., Short-term Effects of Ambient Sulphur Dioxide and Particulate Matter on
Mortality in 12 European Cities: Results from Times Series Data from the APHEA Project: Air Pollution and Health: a European Approach. 314 BMJ 1658 (1997), J.M.
Samet, F. Dominici, F.C. Curriero, I. Coursac, S.L. Zeger, Fine Particulate Air Pollution
and Mortality in 20 U.S. Cities, 1987-1994, 343(23) N. Engi. J. Med. 1742 (2000),
Schwartz J, Air Pollution and Daily Mortality: A Review and Meta Analysis, 64(1)
Environ. Res. 36 (1994), D.W. Dockery, C.A. Pope III, X. Xu et aI., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six US Cities, 329 N. Engi. J. Med. 1753 (1993),
C.A. Pope III, M.J. Thun, M.M. Namboodiri et aI., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of US Adults, 151 Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med.
669 (1995), D. Krewski, R. Burnett, M.S. Goldberg et al., Reanalysis of the Harvard Six
Cities Study and the American Cancer Society Study of Particulate Air Pollution and
Mortality: Health Effects Institute Special Report, Boston: Health Effects Institute
(2000), C.A. Pope III, R.T. Burnett, M.J. Thun et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary
Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132
(2002).
57 Agencies listing gasoline and diesel exhaust as carcinogens: The list of "chemicals known to the State of California to cause cancer" can be found at:
http://www.oehha.c a.gov/prop65/prop65_listlNewlist.html; Studies finding diesel exhaust causes cancer: California EPA 1998. Proposed Identification of Diesel Exhaust as
a Toxic Air Contaminant. Part B: Health Risk Assessment for Diesel Exhaust. Califor-
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problems,59 reproduction and fetal problems/o and nervous sysnia Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, Air Toxicology and Epidemiology Section, May 1998; Bhatia R, Lopipero P,
Smith AH., Diesel Exhaust Exposure and Lung Cancer. Epidemiology 9(1):84-91 (1998).
Studies finding benzene causes leukemia: Rinsky, RA; Smith, AB; Horning, R; et aI.,
Benzene and Leukemia: An Epidemiologic Risk Assessment. N Engl J Med 316:10441050 (1987). Study linking butadiene and leukemia: Delzell E; Sathiakumar N; Hovinga M., A follow·up study of synthetic rubber workers, Toxicology 113:182-189 (1996).
Other VOCs that cause cancer: Brief summaries of scientific data on many of the compounds in fuels and exhaust have been prepared by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency and are available on-line from the Integrated Risk Information
System (IRIS): http://www.epa.gov/iriS/index.html.
.. Hospitalization for respiratory causes: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter, Vol. 3. Publication No. PB96168257EPAl600/P-95/001CF (1996). Effect of Motor Vehicle Emissions on Respiratory
Health in an Urban Area. Environ. Health Perspect. 110(3):293-300; Detels R, et al.,
The UCLA Population Studies of CORD: X. A Cohort Study of Changes in Respiratory
Function Associated With Chronic Exposure to SOX, NOx, and Hydrocarbons. Am J
Public Health 81:350-359 (1991). Pulmonary growth in children: Gauderman WJ, et al.,
Association between air pollution and lung function growth in southern California
children: results from a second cohort, Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 166(1):76-84 9
(2002); Horak F. Jr., et al., Particulate Matter and Lung Function Growth in Children:
A 3-yr Follow-Up Study in Austrian Schoolchildren. Eur. Respir. J. 19(5):838-45 (2002).
Asthma: Koenig JQ., Air Pollution and Asthma, J Allergy Clin. Immunoi. 104(4 Pt
1):717 -22 (1999); McConnell R, et ai. Air Pollution and Bronchitic Symptoms in South·
ern California Children with Asthma, Environ. Health Perspect. 107:757-760 (1999);
Delfino RJ., Epidemiologic Evidence for Asthma and Exposure to Air Toxics: Linkages
Between Occupational, Indoor, and Community Air Pollution Research. Environ.
Health Perspect. 110 Suppl 4:573-89 (2002); McConnell R, Berhane K, et al., Asthma in
Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A Cohort Study. Lancet 359(9304):386-91
(2002); Brauer M, et al., Air Pollution from Traffic and the Development of Respiratory
Infections and Asthmatic and Allergic Symptoms in Children. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care
Med 166(8):1092-8 (2002). Other ozone effects: Gilliland FD, et al., The effects of ambi·
ent air pollution on school absenteeism due to respiratory illnesses, Epidemiology.
Jan;12(1):43-54 (2001); Balmes JR, et aI., Effects of ozone on normal and potentially
sensitive human subjects. Part I: Airway inflammation and responsiveness to ozone in
normal and asthmatic subjects. Res. Rep. Health Eff. Inst 78:1-37 (1997); White MC,
Etzel RA, Wilcox WD, Lloyd C., Exacerbations of childhood asthma and ozone pollution
in Atlanta, Environ, Res. 1994;65:56-68; Norris G, et al., An association between fine
particles and asthma emergency department visits for children in Seattle. Environ.
Health Perspect. 107(6):489-93 (1999); Friedman M.S., et aI., Impact of changes in
transportation and commuting behaviors during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in
Atlanta on air quality and childhood asthma. JAMA285(7):897-905 (2001).
50 Dockery DW., Epidemiologic evidence of cardiovascular effects of particulate
air pollution, Environ. Health Perspect. 109 Suppl 4:483-486 (2001); Schwartz J., Air
pollution and hospital admissions for heart disease in eight U.S. counties, Epidemiology
10(1):17-22 (1999); Burnett R.T., Smith-Doiron M., Stieb D., Cakmak S., Brook J.R.,
Effects of particulate and gaseous air pollution on cardiorespiratory hospitalizations,
Arch Environ Health 54:130-139 (1999); Mann J.K., Tager LB., Lurmann F. et al., Air
pollution and hospital admissions for ischemic heart disease in persons with congestive
heart failure or arrhythmia, Environ. Health Perspect. 110(12):1247-52 (2002); Linn
WS, Szlachcic Y, Gong H Jr, Kinney PL, Berhane K.T., Air pollution and daily hospital
admissions in metropolitan, Los Angeles Environ. Health Perspect. 108(5):427-434
(2000).
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tern toxicity.6l In 1990, the United States Environmental Protection Agency declared "over half the cancer incidence is
caused by air pollution coming from cars."6' Babies and children are most at risk due to physiological vulnerabilities, such
as greater relative exposure, less developed metabolism, and
higher rates of cell production, growth, and change. 63 Furthermore, there are social vulnerabilities such as poverty, malnutrition, and environmental injustice."
American auto manufacturers and oil industries have historically favored profits over protecting public and environmental health. The Big Three automobile manufacturers once
claimed that the auto industry would be ruined by the added
expense if required to install seatbelts and air bags."· Beginning in the 1930s, National City Lines, a company backed by
General Motors, Standard Oil, Philips Petroleum, Firestone
Tires and Rubber, Mack Truck, and other interests, systematically bought up and closed down more than 100 electric trolley
lines in 45 cities across the country.66 In 1949, a federal grand
jury indicted GM and the other companies of conspiring to replace electric transportation systems with buses and to monopolize the sale of buses."7 In 1969, the Justice Department
60 Ritz B, Yu F., The effect of ambient carbon monoxick on low birth weight
among children born in southern California between 1989 and 1993, Environ. Health
Perspect. 107:17-25 (1999); Woodruff TJ, Grillo J, Schoendorf KC., The Relationship
Between Selected Causes of PostneonatalInfant Mortality and Particulate Air Pollution
in the United States, Environ. Health Perspect. 105:608-612 (1997); Ritz B, Yu F,
Chapa G, Fruin S., Effect of air pollution on pre term birth among children born in
Southern California between 1989 and 1993. Epidemiology 11(5):502-511 (2000); Ritz
B, Yu F, Fruin S, Chapa G, Shaw GM, Harris JA., Ambient air pollution and risk of
birth defects in Southern California, Am. J. Epidemiol. 155(1):17-25 (2002).
61 Neurotoxicity of gasoline, air pollution or specific compounds: Ostro B., Lead:
evaluation of current California air quality standards with respect to protection of
children. (2000) (Rep. prepared for the California Air Resources Board and California
Office
of
Environmental
Health
Hazard
Assessment
at
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/air/criteria_pollutantslAQAC2.html); Burbacher TM., Neurotoxic effects of gasoline and gasoline constituents, Environ. Health Perspect. 101 Suppl
6:133-41 (1993).
62 JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FORA RIDE, 236 (2000).
63 Joy E. Carlson, Children's Environmental Health Research - an Introduction,
Environ.
Health
Perspect.
106,
Supplement
3
(June
1998),
at
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docsl1998/Suppl-3/intro1.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
54 Id.
Along the same lines, though less documented, wildlife are likely suffering
similar impacts from exposure to petro emissions .
.. Paul C. Judge, Selling Autos by Selling Safety, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at
D1.
66 JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 236 (2000).
67 JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 236 (2000).
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charged the Automobile Manufacturers Association, along with
American Motors, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, with
conspiring to prevent and delay the manufacture and use of
pollution-control devices for automobiles. 68
The concentration of petroleum fuel by-products from
automotive combustion is responsible for as much as fifty percent of ozone in urban areas and is one of the country's largest
sources of greenhouse gases that cause global warming.""
Claiming that global warming is unproven, the petro industry
has engaged in a disinformation campaign similar to the tobacco industry's. 70 It spent millions of dollars funding the
Global Climate Coalition ("GCC") to convince the public global
warming is not a threat and to lobby Congress against participation in the Kyoto ProtocoL 71 This mimics the deceptive
claims made for years by the tobacco industry.72 Further, all
the major automobile manufacturers have developed more fuelefficient vehicles, and the oil industry--more so than any other
industry--is in the position to take the lead in hydrogen fuel
production when oil runs out. Yet both industries, automobile
and oil, have decided to make less harmful products available
only to an extremely limited, if not practically unavailable,
market. 73 For example, a waiting list for the Toyota Prius (a
hybrid vehicle that gets about 60 miles to the gallon) currently
exists, and only recently was the vehicle even placed on the
market. 7•
.. Elizabeth Grossman, supra note I.
.. STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASsESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 1 (1995);
Excerpt from Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2000, pA,
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Program, Office of Atmospheric Programs, United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
April
2002,
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/contentlemissions.html (last visited Feb.
13,2005).
70 See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Expert Criticizes Bush on Global Warming
Policy, N.Y. Times, October 26, 2004, at A22.
71 Statement of the Global Climate Coalition Before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works Hearing on S. 556, the Clean Power Act, November 1,
2001, at http://epw.senate.gov/107thlGlobal_Climate_Coalition.htm.
'12 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Automotive Resources International, Environmental Fleet TechnolNewsletter,
Volume
IV-Number
IX,
August
30,
2004,
at
ogy
http://www.arifleet.com/efnews/ef2004lEF0409.pdf(last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
7. See, e.g., George Raine, "Hybrid Buyers are Waiting in the Wings; Environmentally Conscious Line Up to Buy Most Fuel-Efficient Cars," San Francisco Chronicle, April 21, 2004, at AI.
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The majority of Americans are dependent on petroleum
fuel and inefficient automobiles, and while some have attempted to reduce their use, petroleum-driven engines are far
more available, socially accepted, and highly promoted than
nonpolluting engines. The petro industry has failed to warn
the public of health harms and opposed all efforts to lowering
fuel economy.75 Yet, the petro industry is costing California
billions not only in Medicare expenses, but also in environmental cleanup costS. 76 The far-reaching and pernicious impacts of the oil industry necessitate a legal effort similar to the
tobacco tort litigation to control or reduce the industry's adverse impacts.
B.

PUBLIC COSTS

It is estimated that reducing oil consumption could conceivably result in tens of billions of dollars per year to the U.S.
economy and increased leverage on the climate-change problem, "whose potential costs are huge but incalculable.'7'77 Public
costs that could be estimated and recovered for harm caused by
using petroleum products include health costs, air- and waterpollution costs, environmental cleanup costs, and crop productivity losses:" In 1997 Americans paid $4 billion, or $.05 per
gallon of gasoline, in additional cost due to ozone-related respiratory health problems, and up to tens of billions of dollars, or
$.59 per gallon of diesel, in additional costs due to increased
morbidity and premature mortality caused by particulates and
acidic aerosols.79 This estimate is based on multiple studies in
different years, and it provides one indication of the amount of

7. See, e.g. Statement of the Global Climate Coalition Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Hearing on S. 556, the Clean Power Act, November 1, 2001, at http://epw.senate.gov/107thlGiobaCClimate_Coalition.htm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2005)
76 See infra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
77 STAFF
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 2-3 (1995).
78 Moore, J. et aI., Oil Imporls: An Overview and Update of Economic and Security Effects, December 12, 1997, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,
98-1,
at
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/energy/eng53.cfm?&CFID=19135639&CFTOKEN=76079875 (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
78 Id.
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California's Medicare expenses that could be recoverable for
petro-related harms. ao
Environmental, health, and social costs represent the largest portion of the externalized price Americans pay for their
gasoline reliance, totaling $231.7 to $942.9 billion every year. al
An estimated $29.3 to $542.4 billion of this is just for uncompensated health costs associated with automobile emissions. a2
A 1999 estimate placed the national external costs of air pollution from motor vehicles between $24.3 billion and $450 billion,
and the total national direct costs of adverse health effects due
to air pollution at $54.7 billion to $672.3 billion a year. a3 These
figures represent costs for everything from headaches to hospitalization, asthma attacks to respiratory illness, and chronic
illness to mortality.a. Particulate matter (PM-IO) accounted for
the vast majority of these costs ($16.7 billion to $432 billion).a5
In the Los Angeles area, health-related air pollution damages can run between $7.8 billion to $88.6 billion a year. a6 It is
projected that in 1992, the annual economic value of avoiding
air pollution health effects in the South Coast Air Basin of
California, in which Los Angeles is located, was nearly $10 billion. a7 Attaining commensurate air pollution standards would
have saved 1,600 lives. 88 Lost productivity due to illness caused
by auto-related air pollution is also a major cost to society and
the economy."9
Other estimates of external public costs, such as tax subsidization of the oil industry, government program subsidies,
60 Id. (illtimately a similar cost analysis to that done in the tobacco litigation
would be necessary for exact figures.); See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
81 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, THE REAL PRICE OF
GAS available at http://www.icta.org/projects/trans/rlprexsm.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2005). ICTA is a think tank. founded the Jacques Ellul Society. See generally Tom
Doggett, Real Cost Of u.S. Gasoline Is $15.14 Per Gallon?, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1998.
82 Id.
83 Mark A. Delucchi, Environmental Externalities of Motor- Vehicle Use in the US,
JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol. 34, part 2, Publication No. UCDITS-RP-00-14 at 135-168 (2000) .
.. Id.
85 Id.
86 McCubbin, Donald R. and Mark A. Delucchi, The Health Costs of Motor Vehicle
Related Air Pollution, JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Publication
No. UCD·ITS-RP-99-16 (1999).
87 Jane V. Hall, et al, Valuing the Health Benefits of Clean Air, Science, Vol. 255,
Issue 5046, 812-817 (Feb. 14, 1992)..
88 Id.
89 Id.
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protection costs in oil shipment and motor vehicle services, environmental, health, and social costs of gasoline usage, and
other externalities of motor vehicle use, total $558.7 billion to
$1.69 trillion per year.90 When added to the retail price of gasoline, this makes the real per gallon price of gas between $5.60
and $15.14.91
C.

ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS

Environmental costs that petro plaintiffs may be able to
recover based on expense totals kept in the state's public records are abatement, regulatory, and remediation costs not recovered from the responsible parties. 92 Estimates of annual
values for significant environmental externalities include
global warming ($3 to $27.5 billion) and water pollution ($8.4
to $36.8 billion).93 A more conservative estimate finds water
pollution associated with motor vehicle use (such as leaking
tanks, oil spills, and polluted runoff) results in environmental,
economic, and health costs of $0.4 to 1.5 billion annually.9'
Other costs associated with localized air pollution attributable
to gasoline-powered automobiles include decreased agricultural
yields ($2.1 to $4.2 billion), reduced visibility ($6.1 to $44.5 billion), and damage to buildings and materials ($1.2 to $9.6 billion).95
The petro industry "indirectly" causes the growth of urban
sprawL 96 Even the impact of urban sprawl adds to the eco90 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, THE REAL PRICE OF
GAS available at http://www.icta.org/projectsltrans/rlprexsm.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2005). ICTA is a think tank founded the Jacques Ellul Society. See generally Tom
Doggett, Real Cost Of U.S. Gasoline Is $15.14 Per Gallon?, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1998.
9' Id.
92 See, e.g., John J. McAleese III, Using the Freedom of Information Act in Superfund cases; Tactical Approaches to Evidence, ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND
LITIGATION STRATEGIES, 1 (Mar. 1996).
93 Id.
.. Mark A. Delucchi, Environmental Externalities of Motor- Vehicle Use in the US,
JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol. 34, part 2, Publication No. UCDITS-RP-00-14 at 135-168 (2000) .
.. INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, THE REAL PRICE OF
GAS available at http://www.icta.org/projectsltrans/rlprexsm.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2005). ICTA is a think tank founded the Jacques Ellul Society. See generally Tom
Doggett, Real Cost Of U.S. Gasoline Is $15.14 Per Gallon?, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1998.
96 Id.
The nature of petro dependence breeds a social structure of long, inefficient commutes, evidenced by the 1.5 billion gallons of fuel annually - nearly 36 million
barrels of oil - that the U.S. saved since the 19908 through increased use of public
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nomic consequences wrought by the petro industry.·7 These
include "additional environmental degradation (up to $58.4
billion), aesthetic degradation of cultural sites (up to $11.7 billion), social deterioration (up to $58.4 billion), additional municipal costs including costs of regulatory agencies (up to $53.8
billion), and additional transportation costs (up to $145 billion). "98 Researchers in the field of transportation cost analysis
reduce their totals by twenty-five to fifty percent to account for
any error in the cost analysis." Still they "arrive at a total of
$163.7 to $245.5 billion per year. moo
III. PROPOSAL
A.

PETRO TORT LITIGATION MADE FEASmLE BY TOBACCO
LITIGATION

The fruits of asbestos litigation made it feasible to underwrite tobacco litigation and now the fruits of tobacco litigation
may make it feasible to underwrite petroleum litigation. 101 In
tobacco and asbestos litigation, alliances between state and
"private" attorneys general created sufficient resources to withstand tobacco industry defenses. 102 While this alliance may
once again be necessary, the same legal tactics and tort theories, such as products liability and nuisance, may possess an
even greater likelihood of success against the petro industry. loa

transport.
NRDC,
Reducing
U.S.
Oil
Dependence,
at
http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/fensec.asp#note19 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). Reduced
oil derived transport would reduce suburban sprawl and cut the need for driving.Id.
fflId.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Michael L. Rustad, supra note 50, at 517.
102 Michael L. Rustad, supra note 50, at 519; See Henry Weinstein & Myron
Levin, Tobacco Companies Flood Internet with Documents Litigation, 27 Million Pages
are Posted to Deflect Critics, Charges They're Hiding Damaging Information, LA.
TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1988, at AI; See generally Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781
F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that in asbestos litigation "punitive damages
reward individuals who serve as 'private attorneys general' in bringing wrongdoers to
account.").
103 See discussion supra, Section I.
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TOBACCO TORT LITIGATION THEORIES APPLIED TO
CALIFORNIA PETRO TORT LITIGATION

California is an appropriate first venue for petro tort litigation, as it has often been at the forefront of environmental
protection. It has, for example, pioneered legislation directed
at controlling vehicle emissions. 'o, As early as 1947, California
enacted enabling legislation so local jurisdictions could cope
with particular pollution-control problems. 105 Moreover, it is
the only state with a waiver from federal fuel regulations. 'oo In
regard to products liability, it is the birthplace of strict liability.107 It also has a favorable political climate. The feasibility of
a California common-law products liability and public-nuisance
suit against petro defendants, namely petroleum fuel and internal combustion engine ("ICE") manufacturers, will thus be
the focus of this Comment, though the same theories can be
applied elsewhere.

1.

Petro Plaintiff Standing

Any petro tort lawsuit begins with the preliminary question of whether the plaintiffs would have legal standing to
bring a petro tort suit. In two cases based on common-law
theories of products liability and nuisance against the petro
industry for motor-vehicle emissions-related harms, the courts
found the plaintiffs pled as indeterminately large groups that
the courts felt had too divergent of interests to be fairly adjudicated.
In Diamond, the plaintiffs alleged tort theories of
products liability and nuisance against automobile manufacturers, petroleum refiners, gasoline filling stations, and others
for injury from the pollution caused by use of petroleum prodlOB

104 City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262, 1269 n.17 (7'h Cir.

1972).
[d.
Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n, Inc. v. Davis, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (E.D. Cal.
2001), affd, 331 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2003).
107 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
lOB Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-643 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971); City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
affd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7'h Cir. 1972). In a similar action initiated by several states before
the Supreme Court, the Court declined to exercise original jurisdiction, holding that
the issue was best decided locally. Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109,
116 (1972).
lOS

lOS
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uctS.'09 The plaintiffs attempted to represent a class by aggregating 7,119,184 claims based on their common status as property owners, for unliquidated damages arising out of 7,119,184
special injuries. llO The court found each individual plaintiff required a determination of the fact of injury separately as to
each resident as against each defendant and the plaintiffs had
joined defendants without alleging any facts that would make
them jointly or vicariously liable. III The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal based on problems of trial and proof, finding the class claim "... beyond [the
trial court's] effective capability."ll2 In City of Chicago, Chicago
sought to represent all Illinois citizens who were residents of
Chicago whose health and welfare had been endangered by the
defendant's activities. ll3 The court did not think Chicago adequately represented the class, as some of the members would
be adversely affected by the suit, such as motor vehicle dealers
and retail gas outlet owners.ll4
The recent wave of tobacco litigation overcame these legal
hurdles to standing, as can petroleum litigation. Although the
California court of appeal in Diamond held the size of the
plaintiff class (over seven million), the diversity of their interests, and the multiplicity of issues would make the proceeding
unmanageable, it stated that the dismissal "is not a bar either
to individual actions, or to other class actions appropriately
framed."ll6 No plaintiff has attempted a similar litigation since
Diamond. The outcome of Diamond suggests petro pollution
litigants can get a case heard on its merits. The plaintiffs,
however, must either be smaller groups with more particularized harm, or state officials. For example, children suffering
ll5

Diamond, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642-643.
11°Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 City of Chicago, 332 F. Supp. at 288.
114 Id.
Dictum indicated the court thought unemployment would harm a considerable number of these people. Id. However, requiring more stringent air pollution
standards, or an alternative energy market, would undoubtedly create jobs. Id. Also, a
provision in the suit could require that middlemen in the petro market be outfitted
with the means to sell the new types of vehicles and fuel at the petro industry's expense.Id. The court also felt the city did not adequately represent those individuals
who were "strongly attached" to motor vehicles. Id. Arguably, those people are not
strongly attached but have no choice. Id.
115 See supra notes 14-52 and accompanying text.
116 Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 641-643 & n. 5.
100
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from respiratory illnesses caused or exacerbated by tailpipe
emissions living in proximity to highways or heavily trafficked
streets are a more "manageable" group than the putative class
in Diamond.l17 If farmers sue for decreased productivity caused
by pollution, such claims of injury to business or property may
warrant standing since "a diminished crop yield would constitute injury to commercial interests.",18 Another possible group
that may have standing is a nonprofit organization, such as an
environmental organization or the American Lung Association. u9 It has been suggested that all coastal states may have
standing based on harms caused by global warming, such as
"rising sea levels due to thawing permafrost and melting and
thinning sea ice.",20 Based on the outcome of the tobacco litigation, however, an action brought by the State Attorney General
for reimbursement of Medi-Cal expenses or environmental
cleanup expenditures appears to have the greatest likelihood of
success. 121

2.

Likely Preemption Defenses

In the tobacco tort litigation, the United States Supreme
Court, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, held that a plaintiffs failure-to-warn and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims were
preempted because they involved obligations within the meaning of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
See supra notes 58 and 63-64.
See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 1973)
(in antitrust suit, court held farmers satisfied first requisite of standing under Clayton
Act Section 4 for allegation of injury to "business or property" from defendant's conspiracy to eliminate anti-pollution devices).
119 See, e.g., Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se plaintiff, in
averring that his respiratory discomfort will be aggravated by emissions from developments on former federal lands, asserts an injury that is sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy standing); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d
168, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "the Residents have alleged concrete and particularized injury in the form of increased traffic, pollution, and noise"); Sierra Club v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 129 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that interest in being
free from increased auto emissions conferred standing) .
120 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-Sa-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1,22 (2003).
121 See discussion supra Section I. Section 14124.71 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code authorizes a public entity to bring a cause of action on behalf of persons receiving medical assistance from a government agency against a third party for
reimbursement of medical expenses when the third party is responsible for the injury.
In 1998 this provision was the used by California in its claim based on products liability against the tobacco industry.
117

Ill!
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(hereinafter "FCLA") of 1965. '22 The Court held that other
common-law claims not involving obligations within the
FCLA's meaning were not preempted. '23
In Cipollone, the Court stated preemption analysis begins
with the assumption that federal law does not supersede "the
historic police powers of the States ... unless [it] is the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. "'24 The presumption against
preemption of a state's police powers is strong. 125 If Congress
intends to supersede this power it must do so either explicitly
as stated in the express language of an act or implicitly as contained in an act's structure and purpose. '26 In the absence of
explicit statutory language, state law is preempted if it actually
conflicts with an act, or if an act "so thoroughly occupies any
legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."'27 If preemption is explicitly addressed, (applying a variation of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius) the court may find that the provision is a reliable indicium of congressional intent and refrain
from inferring any Congressional intent beyond the preemption
language. 128
Relevant to petro litigation is the states' significant power
to protect their air, water, and land, as well as the lives, health,
and comfort of their residents. 129 In response to petro plaintiffs'
state common-law claims, petro defendants will likely raise
three federal laws as the basis of preemption defenses: the
Clean Air Act (hereinafter "CAA"), Resource Conservation and
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
[d.
124 [d. at 516 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947».
125 [d. at 524.
126 [d. at 516 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977».
127 [d. at 516 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982».
128 [d. at 516-517.
126 As early as 1907 the United States Supreme Court wrote: "[Tlhe State has an
interest independent of and behind the title of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air ... It is a fair and reasonable
demand on the part of sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted ..
. that that forests on its mountains ... should not be further destroyed or threatened ..
. that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered .... " In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Ga. v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907) (Court granted State's claim for an injunction,
on behalf of mainly private citizen property owners, to enjoin defendant copper mines
from discharging noxious gases).
122
123
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Recovery Act (hereinafter "RCRA"), and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (hereinafter "CERCLA").

a.

CAA Preemption Defense

Products liability and nuisance claims against petroleum
fuel and ICE manufacturers may both face preemption defenses based on the CAA. Petroleum fuel defendants, however,
may have a weak defense. The CAA includes an express preemption provision that prohibits the states from imposing any
control or prohibition of motor vehicle fuels and fuel additives
"for purposes of motor vehicle emission control."'30 One of the
exceptions to this provision, however, is that the CAA permits
California, as a state that regulated automotive emissions before Congress entered the field, to "at any time prescribe and
enforce for the purpose of motor vehicle emission control, a control or prohibition respecting any fuel or fuel additive. "'31 In
holding that California could enact a ban on the gasoline additive MTBE, for the purpose of preventing contamination to private wells, the Ninth Circuit rejected express and implied preemption arguments based on the CAA.132 It held California's
waiver from federal fuel regulations is broad and unqualified
and gives California a "freer hand than the EPA. "'33 The court
found Congress's "clear and manifest purpose" was not "to preempt the field where California is concerned. "134 It even held
California may act to ban fuel for other purposes besides emission control. 135 While petro defendants will likely argue that
allowing a common-law action for petroleum fuel would destabilize the national economy and fuel supply, the Ninth Circuit's
response to a similar argument regarding the ban of MTBE
was that the CAA does not require California to consider the
42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2004).
CAA § 211(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B). California is the only state that
"regulated automotive emissions prior to March 30, 1966. Thus, it is the only state
that is eligible for [the) waiver" that exempts it from federal preemption of state regulations of fuel standards under Section 7545(c)(4)(B). Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n, Inc., 163
F. Supp. 2d at 1185 n.2.
132 Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
133 Id. at 1184-85
134 Id. at 1187.
135 Id. at 1186.
130
131
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national price and supply of gasoline. las A federal goal of ensuring an adequate supply of a product was too speculative to support preemption. 137
California common-law claims against ICE manufacturers
have a less-certain outcome. ,a8 California's exemption from federal preemption of state regulation of fuel standards has yet to
be applied to vehicle or engine-part requirements. '39 Currently,
California may assert this waiver in defense of a state law requiring reduction of carbon dioxide from automobiles. 140 But
this case may take years to unfold. Favorable precedent exists
for plaintiffs suing under common-law theories against stationary air polluters to overcome CAA preemption defenses, but no
case speaks directly to the issue regarding mobile sources. '4l
Section 209 of the CAA makes the direct application of stationary precedent difficult. Section 209(a) provides:
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines ..
No State shall require certification, inspection, or any
other approval relating to the control of emissions from any
new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition
precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment. (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2004).

Unless California's waiver is held to apply to ICEs, the petro
industry's defenses here would be similar to the tobacco indus[d. at 1187-88.
[d.
138 The following policy analysis in support of state retention of authority under
the CAA buttresses petro plaintiff's claims against petroleum fuel manufacturers. See
infra notes 139-165 and accompanying text.
139 Section 209(b) of the CAA establishing California's waiver from fuel regulation
under Section 211(c)(4)(B), while arguably broad enough to cover the manufacture and
sale of vehicle and engine parts, has strangely not been asserted. See, e.g., Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt District, 541 U.S. 246, 252-258 (2004).
140 Greenwire, Clean Air: Car Companies to Sue California Over Emissions Law,
2004 WL 91332672, Dec. 7,2004.
141 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that any state nuisance claim addressing substantive law of air pollution
under the CAA could be handled in state court); See also Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
798 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (W.O. Tex. 1992) (holding that preemption of state common
law claims by the CAA would not further the goals of the CAA or the intent of Congress).
lll6

137
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try's preemption defenses in Cipollone.'42 Namely, that a federal law specifically relates to the applicable common-law
claims but does not directly address the issue. Cipollone held
the central inquiry in such a case is "whether the legal duty
that is the predicate of the common law ... action" satisfies the
act's express terms, giving those terms "a fair but narrow reading."'43 Accordingly, petro plaintiffs' ICE tort claims would appear to be preempted if they rely on a state law that requires
any "approval" relating to the control of emissions or attempts
to create "any standard" relating to the control of emissions on
new ICEs.'"
The predicate duty of petro plaintiffs' products-liability
claim is arguably a state-law duty not to place defective products on the market that cause injury to human beings. 145 The
predicate duty of their nuisance claims is a duty not to create
anything that is injurious or offensive to the public health or
comfort. '46 Proving these theories would not be based on a determination of whether manufacturers complied with emissions
standards or a demonstration that the engines do not comply
with federal law. In Cipollone, the Court applied this analysis
to decide that fraudulent-misrepresentation claims based on
concealment of a material fact arising with respect to advertising and promotions are not preempted by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling Act.147 The court decided such claims are not predicated "on a duty 'based on smoking and health' but rather on a
more general duty not to deceive."148 Petro plaintiffs could similarly assert their claims are not based on a duty to comply with
Federal emissions standards, but rather on a more general obligation - the duty not to injure human beings and natural
places. Preempting such claims would be effectively allowing
zones of sacrifice.
The CAA's savings provision, absent in the act analyzed in
Cipollone, increases petro plaintiffs' chances of defeating a preemption defense based on the CAA.149 The CAA's savings proviSee infra notes 143-148.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
144 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 541 U.S. at 257.
145 See discussion supra Section II.
142

143

146

[d.

147

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-529.

[d.
14' [d.
148

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8

454

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

sion retains substantial retention of state authority.'5o It states
that, except in limited circumstances, "[n]othing in [the] Act
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement
respecting control or abatement of air pollution . . .m5' From
this the Ninth Circuit observed that the CAA envisions, without specifically authorizing, other remedial actions where such
are grounded in statute or common law.'52 The Supreme Court
has held savings clauses allow for a narrow reading of a statute
that preserves common-law claims.'5a
Courts have noted several other provisions of the CAA that
further support retention of state authority and a narrow reading of Section 209(a).'54 When drafting the CAA, Congress
found "that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants
produced or created at the source) and air pollution control at
its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.'''55 The Supreme Court held that Congress recognizes the CAA is not a uniform, nationwide solution to every
aspect of air pollution. '56 Furthermore, the CAA states Congress's purpose is "to provide technical and financial assistance
to State and local governments in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention and control programs.'''5' To this end, citizens, states, and local governments are empowered to initiate actions to enforce compliance with the Act and to enforce other statutory and commonlaw rights.'5s
Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n Inc., v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 2003).
42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West 2004) .
•52 California ex rei. State Air Resources Bd. v. Dep't. of Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271,
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that Clean Air Act did not preempt state's air pollution
action because state had broad power to implement air pollution strategies), affd 624
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980).
• 53 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) .
... See, e.g., Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n Inc., 331 F.3d at 671.
'55 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(3) (West 2004).
156 Washington v. General Motors Corp. 406 U.S. 109, 114-116 (1972) (quoting 81
Stat. 485,42 U. S. C. § 1857 (a)(3».
157
42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b)(3) (West 2004) (emphasis added) .
• 58 CAA Section 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e), provides: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)."
150

'5'
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The only legal effort testing the CAA preemption of state
laws regulating emissions of motor vehicles occurred in the
1970's:59 In the leading case on the issue of CAA preemption
the Supreme Court directed that such cases are best decided
Summarizing fields of CAA preemption, the Court
locally.
noted that "standards" in regard to fuel emissions on new vehicles are largely preempted. 161 This was prompted by the underlying suit filed by 18 states, with 16 filing amicus briefs in support of the states, seeking an order requiring automobile manufacturers to install anti-pollution control devices on all motor
vehicles and to accelerate air pollution research. 162 Only one
region tested this decision. ,s3 The Seventh Circuit held that a
city action seeking to stop the sale of motor vehicles within the
city unless the vehicles were equipped with tamper-proof emission control devices satisfied "standard" under the Section
209(a) prohibition regarding regulation of new motor vehicles
(post-1968).,s4 From the outcome of these cases, it appears a
California court may find the definition of "standard" includes
an action by a local governing body seeking an order requiring
automobile (ICE) manufacturers to take proactive measures as
to all vehicle models (engine types). Arguably in the case of
common-law theories for damages, a different situation exists
than as to a proactive measure being sought to be applied uniformly to all ICE manufacturers.
Rather, what is sought is
the recovery of costs of public expenditures to redress harms
caused by their products or an outright prohibition of the products.
ISO

ISS

b.

RCRA and CERCLA Preemption Defense

A thicket of statutes and regulations govern environmental
cleanup at petroleum-spill sites, possibly making it more difficult for petro plaintiffs, in actions for environmental cost recov'" Washington, 406 U.S. 109; City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d
1262 (7 th Cir. 1972); Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
160 Washington, 406 U.S. at 111 & 113 fn 3.
,., Id.
162 Id.
163 City of Chicago, 467 F.2d 1262.
164 Id. at 1265.
166 Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 642-643 (an appropriately pled common-law claim
against defendant automobile manufacturers is not barred).
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ery, to overcome preemption defenses. l66 Federal and state laws
governing environmental cleanup cost recovery for petroleum
contamination, however, do not facially or by case law preclude
common-law tort actions for environmental harms, so the defenses may be surmountable. 167
State enforcement cleanup actions can be brought under
CERCLA or the Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act (hereinafter "CPTHSAA").168 CPTHSAA is a
California law that authorizes cost recovery spent in environmental response actions, yet excludes petroleum fuel from the
hazardous substances covered by the act, as does CERCLA, the
federal law it was modeled after. 169 Petro plaintiffs can argue
against preemption defenses under either act because petroleum is not covered by their provisions, and the acts do not expressly preempt common-law tort actions: 70 Since such exemptions have precluded CPTHSAA plaintiffs seeking environmental cleanup cost recovery under the general cost recovery
mechanism of the California Hazardous Substance Account Act
(hereinafter "HSAA") from recovering costs incurred in cleaning petroleum contamination in soil, petroleum's exclusion
from the meaning of the act seems apparent.17I Also, the notes
of decisions for the HSAA support the proposition that public

166 Peter Manus, Federalism Under Siege at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal: Preemption and CERCLA after United States v. Colorado, 19 COLUM. J. ENTL. L. 327, 329
(1994); Gregory M. Romano, Note, "Shovels First and Lawyers Later:" A Collision
Course for CERCLA Cleanups and Environmental Torts Claims, 21 WM. & MARy
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV., 421, 422 (1997).
167 Gregory M. Romano, supra note 166, at 422.
168 See
Carpenter-Presley-Tanner
Hazardous Substance Account
Act
("CPTHSAA"), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25300 (Deering's 2005); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or "Superfund"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9628.
169 In practice the state never uses state law; it always sues under CERCLA.
Email Comm. with Cliff Rechtschaffen, Professor of Environmental Law, Golden Gate
School of Law (Dec. 12, 2004). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25317 (West 2005) states
expressly that petroleum, crude oil, and crude oil "fractions" are excepted from the
Act's reach. See also KFC Western Inc. v. Meghrig, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994). Section 101 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 (14) (West 2004) provides "The term
"hazardous substance" ... does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof... (21) The term "release" ... [excludes] emissions from engine exhaust of
motor vehicle, rolling rock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine."
170 See, e.g., Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (court held plaintiff's toxic tort claims not preempted by CERCLA but that they
failed to meet the statute of limitations).
171 mvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal 1993).
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nuisance and California environmental laws are not preempted
by cleanup laws. '72
RCRA, the other commonly used enforcement authority for
environmental cleanup sites, has neither a petroleum exclusion
provision nor a provision preempting common-law tort actions. 173
In 1986, RCRA was amended to include a leaking underground
storage tank (hereinafter "LUST") provision, which specifically
allows state and federal cost recovery from petroleum contamination resulting from LUSTs. 17. California law includes a similar
provision. '75 While this may preempt the field with regard to
LUSTs, plaintiffs claiming other types of petroleum contamination
have pled common-law tort actions in addition to RCRA claims. l76
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently noted that CERCLA's purpose focuses on cleanup of hazardous waste sites and the imposition of all cleanup costs on responsible parties, as opposed to
RCRA's focus on hazardous waste reduction. 177 The petroleum
exclusion in CERCLA, therefore, arguably leaves the field of tort
recovery of cleanup costs available for petroleum contamination. '7s
Also, the discrepancy between the exclusion of petroleum as a
hazardous substance in CERCLA and its inclusion in RCRA may
indicate Congress did not intend the field to be preempted. When
"a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a
court must be chary of reading [any other congressional intent
from] it."'79 Settlements under RCRA, CERCLA, and CPTHSAA
are often far below actual out-of-pocket government expenditures,
indicating a significant potential area of cost recovery for reimbursement of public dollars to petro plaintiffs. ISO
172 California ex reI. California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138
F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1998).
173 RCRA or (Solid Waste Disposal Act) §§ 1002-11012,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k).
174 Section 9002 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6991b.
175 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.70 (West 2005).
17. See, e.g., Nixon-Egli Equip. Co. v. John A. Alexander Co., 949 F. Supp. 1435,
1438 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Tenaya Assocs. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375,
1995 WL 433290 at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993).
177 Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).
178 See, e.g., id. at 485.
179 [d. at 488 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 19 (1979».
ISO A private citizen group could use a Freedom of Information Act Request to
obtain the exact differences between money spent on site response and money recovered from the petroleum companies. Government agencies already have access to this
information.
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Products Liability Causes of Action

California petro plaintiffs, unlike their predecessor tobacco
plaintiffs, do not have to wait for a statutory immunity protection to expire to bring products liability actions. lSI No specific
California statute exempts petroleum and related products
from products liability.ls2 So petro manufacturers are subject to
California products liability law.
Under product liability law in California, as stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, if a product is capable of serious
harm in the design, inspection, or fabrication of the product,
the manufacturer owes a duty not just to the immediate purchaser of the product, but to all persons who might foreseeably
be affected by the product. l83 Liability may be based on theories
of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, or misrepresentation.lS< Claims may incorporate one or all of the underlying theories. ls5 Regardless of the theory, though, the plaintiff
must prove that a product is defective when used for its intended purpose and was defective when it left the defendant's
control, and its defect makes it unreasonably dangerous and
proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. ISS In petro tort litigation, strict liability and negligence appear particularly wellsuited to achieving products-liability's goals of insuring that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products be paid
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market,
rather than by injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves. ls7
181 Rodney R. Moy, supra note 16, at 774 (referring to tobacco exemption repealed
from Section 1714.45 of the California Civil Code). See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
182 Search on LexisNexis of Deering's California Codes Annotated, Court Rules, &
ALS, Comb. (Oct. 4, 2004).
183 Aas v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 627, 637 (2000) (citing MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916».
184 Gary T. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL.
L.
REV. 435 (1979); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974);
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1193 (1994).
185 Gary T. Schwartz, supra note 184; Marshall S. Shapo, supra note 184; Howard
Latin, supra note 184.
186 David Grossman, supra note 120, at 39.
187 MacPherson, 111 N.E. 1050; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d
897 (Cal. 1963). Petro plaintiffs would be amiss to not alternatively allege negligence
and strict liability design defect claims against petro manufacturers. Having explored
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Proof of Causation

A products-liability petro tort case in California may be
tried under one of two variations of the standard of proof of
causation. ISS Ordinarily, under products liability the plaintiff
must prove that defective products supplied by the defendant
were a substantial factor in bringing about his or her injury.IS9
This substantial-factor test, the same as the Restatement (Second)'s, subsumes the cause-in-fact determination. 190 The second
standard of proof is met by establishing a reasonable medical
probability, based on expert testimony, that the defendant's
conduct contributed to the plaintiff's injury.191
Describing the need for the new standard of proof of causation, the California Supreme Court explained that plaintiffs
cannot be expected to prove the scientifically unknown details
of carcinogens or trace the unknowable path of a given toxic
fiber. 192 This implies that a petro fuel manufacturer may be
liable if it is proven individually that its product was a substantial factor in contributing to harm, without requiring tracing the harm to a particular gallon of gas as the cause of the
injury. The Court's preference for the new test is demonstrated
by the Court's application of it in negligence and products liability actions, and in decisions involving carcinogenic pharmaceuticals, asbestos, and a variety of other types of toxic chemical exposure. 193 Applying it to an asbestos design defect claim,
the common law elements of such claims, I analyze only strict liability, which appears
to have the greatest likelihood of success and to focus the greatest detail on the elements applicable to both claims, while keeping this comment to a manageable length.
The alternative negligence claim deserves and requires its own detailed analysis.
188 See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., 980 P.2d 398, 402 (Cal. 1999)
(plaintiff alleged exposure to numerous different types of toxic chemicals caused cancer); Rutherford v. Owens-lllinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1218-1220 (Cal. 1997) (asbestos
litigation); Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 861-863 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
189 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972); Endicott v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); see CACI No. 430
(2004).
190 Bockrath, , 980 P.2d at 403-04 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1213-1214).
UI1 Rutherford, , 941 P.2d at 1218-1220 & n.ll (applied in asbestos litigation);
Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 402 (applied in case in which plaintiff alleged exposure to numerous different chemical substances).
192 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-1219.
193 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-1220 & n.ll (applied in asbestos litigation);
Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 402 (applied in case where plaintiff alleged exposure to a variety
of toxic chemicals caused cancer); Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr.
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the Court asserted the gap in the "humanly unknowable" can
be bridged by showing "in reasonable medical probability" that
the alleged designs of the products were a substantial factor
contributing to the dose of carcinogens inhaled or ingested and
hence to the plaintiff's risk of developing lung cancer.
The same facts in these types of toxic-tort cases led the
courts away from Summers' alternative liability theory to Sindell's market-share liability theory. 105 Market-share liability
theory, however, has only been applied in one circumstance,
"where hundreds of producers ... had made the same drug
from an identical formula, practically precluding patients from
identifying the makers of the drugs they [ingested]. m06 Whether
market-share liability would be permitted in tobacco or petro
litigation is unclear in California, though other states have
held it is appropriate in tobacco litigation authorized by statute. 107 Given the complicated nature of causation in toxic torts
and the newness of the reasonable medical probability test,
some uncertainty also remains about whether it would be applied in petro litigation and the effect it would have on the
plaintiff's case. lOS
I

.'

456, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); see also Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
739,747-748 and n.ll (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
194 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219 & fn.ll (applied in asbestos litigation); Bockrath,
980 P.2d at 402 (applied in case in which plaintiff alleged exposure to numerous different chemical substances).
195 See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218 (explaining that when all potential tortfeasors are not before the court application of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948),
joint and several liability is unfair); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.
1980).
196 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-19.
197 [d. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc.,
678 So. 2d 1239, 1247 (Fla. 1996) (holding that Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act could use either market-share liability or joint and several liability, but not both).
198 See, e.g., Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-863.
It is also uncertain if the Supreme Court's language in Rutherford would be followed exactly. It stated to be a
substantial factor the product's contribution to the plaintiff or decedent's risk or probability of developing cancer must be substantial, it need not be a substantial factor
actually contributing to the injury. Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219-1220. Whiteley held
the plaintiffs must establish to a reasonable medical probability, their illnesses were
caused by the toxic exposure. See, Bockrath, 980 P.2d 403-404 (remanding case back to
the trial court to allow plaintiffs to amend complaints on issue of causation). The uncertainty of the new test on the plaintiff's case has been discussed in Rutherford, 941
P.2d at 1218-1219 (the majority stating that the substantial factor standard is so broad
convincing a jury each product caused exposure should not be that difficult; the dissent
stating the decision will mean many innocent plaintiffs have an insurmountable burden in establishing that exposure to a specific defendant's product was a substantial
cause of injury.). See also Jonathan C. Mosher, A Pound of Cause for a Penny of Proof"
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The most telling sign that a petro plaintiff's case may warrant the new reasonable medical probability test is that it applies in products-liability actions involving claims for relief
arising from chronic and latent illnesses or disease allegedly
caused by exposure to toxic substances. 199 Recently a court
found cigarettes easily fit this description but did not determine which variant on proof of causation applied, because it
found the evidence of causation insufficient under either test."OO
Also, in a setting analogous to that of petro products exposure,
the test has been held appropriate to show causation in an occupational setting with many different sources making it difficult to pinpoint the source. 201 That case held that causation can
be properly alleged under the new test, but the test's version of
"substantial factor" must be proven as to each defendant. 202
Generally speaking, characteristics of cases warranting the
reasonable medical probability test include complex and inscrutable questions of medical causation, involving harm that
flows from a class of products with different toxicities and
brands of products that have differing effects on different product-related diseases. 203
Although basic standards of proof of causation seem applicable to ICEs, petroleum fuel may be found to fit these characteristics. Arguably, petroleum fuel, like asbestos and cigarettes, is in a class of products that have differing propensities
of various forms of products to cause injury and disease. For
example, in asbestos-containing products the specific type of
asbestos fiber incorporated into a product, the physical properties of the product itself, and the percentage of asbestos used in
the product all affect the corresponding potential for inducing

The Failed Economy of an Eroded Causation Standard in Toxic Tort Cases, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 531 (2003) alleging the ruling invites any plaintiff to establish cause; and
V. Thomas Meador III, et. aI., Anti-Toxins: Defense Counsel in Mass Toxic Tort Cases
Can Frequently Prevail By Challenging Plaintiffs' Proof of Both General and Specific
Causation, 26 L.A. LAWYER 33 (2003) (alleging the ruling invites defense counsel to
take advantage of the "frequent inability of plaintiffs to prove general and specific
causation").
199 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-1219.
200 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861-863.
,",I Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 402-404.
ro2 1d.
'"" See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1216-19; Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861-863.
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asbestos-related disease. 204 Similarly, the blends and octanes of
petroleum fuel affect the corresponding potential for inducing
petroleum pollution related disease. 205 A similar analogy can
also be made to cigarette blends, styles, and toxicity.
Under either causation test, petro plaintiffs in a defective
design suit will have to prove that it is the design of the product that caused the injury. The widely accepted belief that
automobile emissions are responsible for significant levels of
air pollution in metropolitan areas suggests the causation burden of proof can be met. Undoubtedly, if the reasonable medical probability test is allowed and the evidence shows that the
design of the petro defendant's products contributed to plaintiffs injuries, the causation element would be satisfied. If not,
the actions that satisfy a substantial-factor test in California
are still relatively broad. 20G A force that plays only a theoretical
part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor, but a very minor force that does cause harm is a
substantial factor. 207 Under either test the standard of proof
must be met as to each defendant if more than one type of defendant manufacturer is involved (otherwise market-share liability could apply).20B Proof of feasible alternative designs will
not affect the outcome under strict products liability if upon
hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that the product's design
is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders:o, This is contrary
to negligent-design products liability, where causation will tum
on proof that the manufacturer's negligence in not using a feasible alternative safer design is the cause of the injury.210
With regard to ICEs, City of Chicago calls into question
whether the breadth of causation for such a claim is allowed

20< Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Pa. 1986), affd,
826 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1987).
206 See supra, notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
2<l6 Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 403-404 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1214-1215).
207 [d. at 403-04 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1214-1215) (citation omitted).
208 [d. at 404 (a case based on a uniform product market share liability as outlined
in Sindell, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), could relieve plaintiffs burden of proving substantial factor to each defendant).
209 Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 453-454 (Cal. 1978).
However,
the availability of alternative feasible design may come into issue in the context of
assessing punitive damages.
210 See, e.g., Whiteley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862-864.
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under common-law principles of products liability.211 The court
determined that alleging all cars as defective created an impossibly indeterminate number of sources to prove that any particular vehicle "caused any particular injury to any particular
person. "212 One way petro plaintiffs might be able to circumvent
this legal hurdle is alleging claims in groups divided by which
of the Big Four automobile manufacturers made their vehicle
and further divided into subcategories of owners of spark ignition ICEs, which is the dominant passenger car and light truck
engine, and owners of diesel ICEs, which constitutes largely
the rest of the market.213 Each owner would be suing for harm
caused by his or her particular product, but the claims would
be aggregated in a class action. This allegation would be based
on the same types of theories used to sue defendant manufacturers for other car parts. 214
One way the causal link was made in the tobacco cases
was the introduction of statistical methods of proof. 215 Plaintiffs
in the tobacco litigation were allowed to show that a widely
distributed product increased the aggregate number of state
residents who contracted a disease; such as lung cancer.216 In
fact, this method of proving causation seems to be widely accepted in cancer-related cases: in the tobacco litigation, between 1994 and 1998, Florida, Vermont, and Maryland all
adopted legislation permitting proof by statistical analysis;217
while Mississippi, Texas, and Minnesota each intended to use
statistical analysis without enacting special legislation. 218 In
toxic-tort cases involving exposure to the drug Bendectin, as
well as silicone, herbicides, and asbestos, courts have allowed
City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1972).
Though arguably the court was referring to Illinois products liability law, the same
issue exists in California.
212 Id.
213 STAFF
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 80 (1995).
214 Self v. General Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that the placement and welding of the car's fuel tank constituted defective
design as manufacturer is required to design his vehicle to minimize unreasonable
risks of injury and death).
215 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329,
330-31 (1999).
21·Id.
217 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(X) (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I
§ 15-120 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1911(f)(5) (2003).
218 Walker & Monahan, supra note 215.
211
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statistical evidence to demonstrate causation where direct
proof of causation was lacking.'19 The prevalence of acceptance
of this method of proof is further evidenced by its use in other
types of cases, like human rights violations and trade cases."o
In general, courts have considered statistical associations as
sufficient to satisfy the requisite more-probable-than-not standard, only if they are supplemented by expert testimony, credible scientific evidence, and demonstrated exposure to the product more than doubled the likelihood the plain tiff suffered the
injury."l This is clearly a formidable task. The advancement of
current scientific and medical technologies may make it possible, however, for petro plaintiffs to prove petro-product-related
health harms if the courts accept such evidence as causation,
such as the signature diseases of asbestosis in asbestos cases
and clear cell adenocarcinoma in DES cases.'"
Generally speaking, in toxic-tort cases, courts have not
found differences among degrees of manufacturer liability to
preclude finding them properly joined. ,,3 The presence of other
sources of air pollution, however, may confuse the issue of causation in petro litigation. Such cases involving the presence of
other potentially liable sources do not generally result in
avoidance of liability altogether, but rather a reduction in
plaintiff's recovery by comparative-fault principles.'" In a case
219 In re Joint E. & S. District Asbestos Litigation, 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995);
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989)(regarding exposure to the
drug Bendectin); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or.
1996)(regarding exposure to silicone); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223 (E.D. N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1234 (1988) (regarding exposure to herbicide).
220 See, e.g., In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F.
Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995), affd, sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103
F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (statistics based on surveys allowed to establish causation in trademark infringement case).
221 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995);
Grossman, supra note 120, at 23.
222 David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 23.
223 See, e.g., Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209-1210 (asbestos litigation); Bockrath v.
Aldrich Chemical Co., 980 P.2d 398, 402 (Cal. 1999) (alleged exposure to numerous
different toxic chemicals cause of cancer); Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr.
3d 807, 861-863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
224 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209-1210 (decedent who smoked a pack of cigarettes
a day for over 30 years allowed to recover for lung cancer caused by asbestos dust exposure.). In tort actions governed by principles of comparative fault a defendant shall
only be severally liable for damages "in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage
offault." Prop 51, Civ. Code Section 1432.2(a) (adopted in 1986).
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in which a smoker sued asbestos manufacturers for lung cancer
caused by asbestos exposure, the court awarded damages but
reduced them by principles of comparative negligence.225
The presence of intermediary products in the causal chain
between the petroleum fuel, the ICE, and the emissions may
further diminish the plaintiff's recovery. The obstacle posed by
intermediary products is mitigated, however, when it is considered that while a number of parts of the vehicle could be alleged to contribute to reduced fuel efficiency, only one is the
"cause" of the emissions - the engine. 226 The ICE in petro suits,
as the lighter in tobacco suits, involves a foreseeable use of the
products that likely will not preclude either petroleum fuel or
ICE manufacturer liability.
The petro defendant's defense to claims of causation will
likely be similar to previous tobacco industry assumption-ofrisk defenses. The need to counter the assumption-of-risk defense may not be present in petro litigation as arguably the
public has no other choice than to buy vehicles. This counterargument is especially applicable to children who are exposed
to emissions involuntarily.227 A person is deemed to have consented under the law only if his or her consent was given voluntarily and with full understanding. 228
b. A Defective Design Action Brought Under Strict Products
Liability
A strict-liability design claim against petro manufacturers
asserts that they are strictly liable in tort for placing petroleum
fuel and ICEs on the market knowing they are to be used without inspection for defects, and as a result of design defects injure people. 229 The petro manufacturers claim that their conduct was reasonable will not relieve them of liability, only the
existence of injury caused by a defect in their products is the

Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209-1210.
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Advanced Automotive Technology: Visions of a Super-Efficient Family Car, OTA-ETI-638, GPO stock #052-00301440-8, p.60-129 September 1995.
227 David Slawson, The Right to Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S. Ca. L. Rev.
672,755 (1986).
228 Id.
229 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
225

226

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

37

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8

466

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

focus of the liability inquiry.230 The strict-liability theory that
California adopted in 1968, embodied in the Restatement (Second) Section 402A, provides in pertinent part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer ... is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer ... if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.231

A "defect" under products liability may take the form of
mismanufacture, failure to give adequate warnings or instructions for safe use, defective design or formulation, or failure to
truthfully represent the quality of the product!3' A mismanufacturing-defect claim alleges a product is not made in accord
with its intended design!33 In warning-defect claims, as some
tobacco plaintiffs alleged, liability is dependent on consumers'
behavior changing if provided with appropriate warnings.'3'
Neither of these factual claims appears applicable to the facts
of petro tort litigation. A design-defect claim, however, as California alleged in its tobacco claim, alleges that the harm arises
from the design of the product itself, and this appears to be a
perfect fit for petro plaintiffs' claims.235 Petro plaintiffs might
be able to sue ICE and petro fuel manufacturers in a design[d.
231 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) § 1243, p. 678). Jenkins v. T&N
PLC, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich
Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
232 Gary T. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 267 Colum. L.
Rev. 435 (1979); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109
(1974); Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 1193 (1994).
233 David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 39-43 .
230

... [d.
235 [d.
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defect suit, arguing that the defects of the automotive and fuel
generation designs are the unnecessary production of significant amounts of toxic chemicals and greenhouse gases, which
lead to plaintiffs' harms from breathing polluted air and global
warming.""·
In California, two legal methods are used to determine if a
product's design is defective: the risk-benefit test and the consumer-expectation test.237 Under the risk-benefit test, the design is defective if an inherent danger in the design of a product outweighs the benefits of the design.238 Under the consumer-expectation test, the design is defective if the product
fails to perform as safely as an ordinary user would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner:39
The latter test is applied in California cases when the ordinary
consumer has a reasonable experience or expectation about an
element of the product's performance claimed to be defective,
but it is not usually applied if the alleged defect is complex and
technical. 2<0 Although the Third Edition of the Restatement of
Torts rejects the consumer-expectation test as an independent
theory, the California Supreme Court declined to overrule it
and established it as an independent and alternative test for a
product defect. 241
The consumer-expectation test's requirement that the
product be in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer is based on the ultimate consumer having "ordinary
knowledge common to the community" as to the product's char236 The legal causation standard is substantiality. All petro defendants that are
substantial causes can be found jointly and severally liable for the harm, subject to
apportionment if feasible. See discussion supra notes 188-228 and accompanying text.
237 Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
238.Anderson v. Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal. 1991).
239 Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 453-454 (Cal. 1978). California
cases have conceded that this concept of "design defect" is a difficult area of precise
definition, so when not compelled by statute, the doctrine's acceptance and the terms of
its applicability have been determined to a large extent by the fundamental policies
that underlie it, as set out in Yuba Power Products, Inc., and its progeny. OwensCorning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (referring to Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
377 P.2d 897.)
240 Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 307-9 (Cal. 1995).
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (proposed final draft Apr. 1, 1997 Section 2,
com. g, p. 29); Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998). But see also McCabe v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 123 Cal. Rptr.
310, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a product may perform so unsafely that whatever the user may have expected, it certainly wasn't that).
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acteristics. 2' 2 This basis became a turning point in the tobacco
litigation when it was discovered the tobacco industry was deceiving consumers as to their product's characteristics, thereby
preventing consumers from learning of the characteristics. 2' 3
Similarly, petro plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate that the
petro industry has deceived consumers by creating a public
smokescreen that alternatives are unavailable and their products are environmentally friendly ..•• For instance, the petro
industry, similarly to the tobacco industry, knows of the many
harms caused by the use of their products, yet many companies
have ad campaigns touting themselves as eco-friendly. Further, they currently fight efforts at increasing fuel economy
standards, have not made alternatives available, and may even
have conspired to keep safer alternatives off the market."6 Further, numerous hidden harms may exist that the petro industry is aware of but fails to make known to its consumers. Examples of hidden health harms include that fact that ordinary
drivers probably do not realize the health harms caused by petroleum emissions. 2' 6 Hidden cost externalities are found in the
fact that ordinary drivers probably do not realize what a trip to
the store really costS. 2' 7 Global warming is a hidden harm because ordinary drivers probably do not realize that a history of
emissions is associated with each gallon in the extraction, refining, and transport processes"'· Additionally, underground
storage tanks ("USTs") are literally and figuratively a hidden
harm because ordinary drivers probably do not know that
USTs exist, much less that they leak pollutants. 2' . Ordinary
drivers probably do not realize the extent of harm caused by oil
refineries or the extent of harm occurring in other countries

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i.
See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
245 See id.
Evidence such as a suit brought then dropped by the Department of
Justice in the 60's suggests the petro industry has in fact conspired to keep safer alternatives off the market. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. General
Motors Corp., 367 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (state alleged agreement among
manufacturers and other acts of delay in development of automobile air pollution control devices).
246 See supra Section II. I.
247 See supra Section 11.2.
248 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
242
243

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss3/8

40

Lipanovich: Smoke Before Oil

2005]

SMOKE BEFORE OIL

469

because of oil use. 250 Finally, retail gas outlets are hidden
harms because ordinary drivers probably do not realize consumer overfills at gas outlets, as well as jobber overfills of underground storage tanks, are significantly contributing to
groundwater, river, and ocean pollution. 251 Just as in the tobacco litigation, if it is shown that petro plaintiffs' are being
deceived, and safer alternatives are being kept off the market
by the industry itself, the petro industry may not be able to
assert a persuasive assumption-of-risk defense. 252 In sum, petro
defendants may argue that consumers have no real expectations about the risk of such harm, so the consumer expectation
test should not be applied; petro plaintiffs may counter that
just as in the tobacco tort litigation, the petro industry should
be held accountable since it has concealed and hidden the
harms and alternatives. 253
Additionally, petro plaintiffs may argue that an ordinary
consumer has a reasonable expectation when buying a car that
the ICE performs safely and when buying fuel that it does not
cause health and global harms. In support of their claims,
petro plaintiffs may be able to compare petroleum fuel to asbestos and other hazardous substances that release toxic byproducts to convince the court that, as in those cases, the consumer
expectations test applies here. 254 Regarding asbestos, the courts
have found that the emission during normal use of toxic respirable fibers that were capable of causing a fatal disease constituted a product failure that violated the commonly accepted
assumptions of ordinary consumers. 255 If this is found to be true
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also, State of Denial, THE
available at http://www.sacbee.comldenial (last visited
on Feb. 6, 2005).
251 See, e.g., Steve Fleischli, Summary of Water Quality Concerns Related to Retail Gas Outlets ("RGOs"), (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, by Santa Monica
BayKeeper based on documents provided by the California Regional Water Quality
Control Board, on file with author); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
("MTBE") Prods.Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599-603 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
252 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 744 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (consumer expectation test applied to home pesticides product that caused disability); Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739, 746-747 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (consumer expectation test applied to asbestos insulation product that caused
fatal disease).
2M See, e.g., Sparks, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-747; Soule v. General Motors Corp.,
882 P.2d 298, 309-310 (Cal. 1994)
260

SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 27,2001,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

41

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8

470

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VoL 35

in petro tort litigation, petroleum defendants' claimed inability
to design petroleum fuel in a different way would be irrelevant,
as California "neither requires nor allows proof of the existence
of a better design under the consumer expectation test. "256
Whether the analysis regarding the ICE of what is "reasonably safe for its intended use" should include anything other
than that related to the transportation of people and things on
roadways is doubtful according to dicta in some legal opinions. 257 One court held social realism never extended the scope
of an automobile manufacturer's duty beyond the highway to a
problem not exclusively related to vehicular use, such as air
pollution. 258 While this interpretation of "social realism" may
have changed since that 1972 opinion, applying even this interpretation to the scope of petroleum fuels "intended use" indicates a close connection with air pollution. This seems to be
supported by the reaction cigarettes go through that falls
within its intended use: the burning of tobacco as compared to
the burning of gasoline. The only alteration to petroleum fuel
occurs when it is being used for its intended use; thus, a consumer reasonably could be said to have an expectation about
the way fuel burns.
Alternatively, if a court decides the risk-benefit test is appropriate, the court will weigh such factors as feasibility and
cost of alternative designs against the inherent risk of harm. 259
As discussed supra, the harms from petro use are arguably significant.260 In assessing the feasibility of an alternative design
the petro plaintiff may be able to adduce evidence that alternative designs currently exist. A court will judge their availability against standards at the time of marketing:61 For past
damages a petro plaintiff's claim, therefore, may have to focus
on older feasible technologies, such as electric cars, multi-valve
engines, and lighter automotive components:62 With current
availability of hydrogen fuel, the possibility of obtaining some
256 Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Cal. Ct.
App.1998).
257 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D.
TIL 1971).
258 [d.
259 Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 454-455 (Cal. 1978).
260 See supra notes 53-100 and the accompanying text.
261 David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 45-46.
262 [d.
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relief against petroleum fuel manufacturers is likely. Certain
claims against ICE manufacturers that allege they are producing fuel-inefficient vehicle designs may also be a viable argument under this test. 263 Targeting vehicle engine manufacturers is particularly likely as alternative engine types have been
around for years."64 Under strict-liability principles, evidence
that the manufacturers "acted as reasonably prudent manufacturers would have under the circumstances will not preclude
the imposition of liability.,,"GS This is true "if, upon hindsight,
the trier of fact concludes that the product's design is unsafe to
consumers, users, or bystanders.
For strict liability, under either test, to prove that a product is defective in design it must be shown that the product's
design is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer."G7 This does
not mean that all dangerous objects fail this test. Even dangerous products, such as a knife's sharp edge, are not necessarily design defects. 268 One defense the petro industry may raise
is that since no feasible way exists to burn petroleum products
without emitting carbon dioxide and harmful toxins, they are
inherently dangerous features of the product, such as a knife's
sharp edge, and are therefore excluded from design defect liability:69 An "inherent feature of a product" such as a knife's
sharp edge, however, is distinguishable from toxic by-products.
The dangerous design of the knife blade is the function for
which it was created, and with care it may be used without
harmful by-products; in the case of petroleum fuel, the harm is
a side product of the design's functionality and the design of
the product results in harm despite careful use.
In petro tort litigation, which defective design test the
court decides is appropriate would likely have a significant impact on the outcome of the litigation. Under the consumerexpectation test, the California petro plaintiffs may show evim66

263

Id.

STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOWGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE
TEcHNOWGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 64 (1995).
264

265 Barker, 573 P.2d 443,453-457.
,.. Id.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
,.. James T. O'Reilly & Nancy C. Cody, The Products Liability Resource Manual,
7 (General practice Section, American Bar Association 1993)(citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
,.., David Grossman, supra note 120, at 44 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)).
"JJJ1
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dence of an objective condition of the product, and the factfinder may then determine whether the product meets ordinary
expectations. In contrast, under the risk-benefit test, even if
the product satisfies the consumer's expectations, if the factfinder decides on the basis of expert testimony that the product
contains excessive, preventable danger or its risk outweighs its
benefit, it still is considered defective.271 Thus, whereas under
the consumer-expectation test, the factfinder draws the conclusion, under the risk-benefit test the expert must draw the link
between the unreasonable dangerousness of the product and
the harm caused. Consequently, a defective design claim may
be successful under strict-liability theory using the consumerexpectation test but not using the risk-benefit test.
For example, in Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., although the jury
found the defendant companies liable on a negligent-design
theory, the court of appeal reversed the judgment.
It ruled
that "consumers' safety expectations could be shaped only by
the package warnings," which federal law governed, and therefore competent expert testimony had to fill the causation gap
between the negligent design and the alleged harm.
The
court found the plaintiffs expert witness had failed to establish
that the asserted design defect of the cigarettes more likely
than not was a substantial factor causing the lung cancer.
Since the case could not be tried on a consumer-expectation
theory, the jury could not bring their common experience and
expectations to measure. Thus, the plaintiffs assertion that
smoking in general was the cause of harm was insufficient,
since no jury speculation (consumer expectation) was allowed.
Evidence that the tobacco companies had developed but failed
to use methods to lower addictive properties of cigarettes, and
that cigarette smoking and lung cancer have a dose-response
27o

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1995).
Barker, 573 P.2d at 454.
272 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 199 (1982); see also
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 863-864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
273 See, e.g., Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864 (court dismissed negligence
claim while stating a strict liability claim based on consumer expectation theory may
have been successful).
274 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834.
276 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864.
276 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834.
277 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864.
278 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834.
270
271
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relationship, was also found to be insufficient. 279 Under the
risk-benefit test expert testimony must specifically prove the
defective nature of the product's design.280

4.

Nuisance Cause of Action

Although California did not use nuisance as a cause of action in its tobacco claim, many other states did. 281 At the time,
applying nuisance in the mass products context had little support in case law, so the defendants' potential liability may have
significantly contributed to the industry's unacceptable risk of
losing, thereby inducing the settlement. 282 Since California's
tobacco litigation, nuisance law has been applied successfully
in mass product litigation against lead paint, handgun, and
MTBE manufacturers. 283 Nuisance law's application to petro
litigation may be especially fitting, as for over 900 years common-law nuisance tort liability has covered offenses involving
environmental interference with the public health and comfort,
in particular "widely disseminated bad odors, dust, and
smoke."284 California codified common-law nuisance liability in
Civil Code Section 3479:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or
use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river,

Z19

Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864.

280

[d.; Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 199 (1982).

281 Donald Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 741, 747 (2003).
2S2 [d. at 763-764.
283 Whitehouse v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226,2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I.
April 2, 2001) (court upheld public nuisance claim against lead pigment manufacturers
and their trade associations); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rep.
225 (2000) (court held plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a nuisance claim
against handgun manufacturers); see also In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12192, (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 2001) (court
allowed public nuisance claim against oil companies for MTBE); White v. Smith &
Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000) .
... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, cmt. b.; Donald G. Gifford, supra
note 281, at 775.
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bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square,
street, or highway, is a nuisance.285

Modern cases liberally construe this section.286 Whether a
given activity "is a nuisance cannot be determined by any fixed
general rule. "287 "It depends upon the facts of each particular
case.'>2SS A court will look at such things as the nature of the
activity, "the extent and frequency of the injury, the effect upon
the enjoyment of health and property, and other similar factors."289 Liability attaches not only to one who intentionally
creates or maintains a nuisance, but also to one who assists in
its creation or maintenance.290 Cases hold that it is unfair to
deny an injured person redress simply because she cannot
prove how much damage each tortfeasor did, when it is certain
that among them they did it all:91
Nuisance law is broken into two fields of tort liability, private nuisance and public nuisance.292 An actor's conduct may
incur liability in either or both.293 A public nuisance is "one
which affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal. 7729. In contrast, every nuisance not included
in the definition of the public nuisance is private:95 Prosser's
distinction between the two has been followed in California
28Ii CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (Deering's 2004); see Levine v. City of Los Angeles, 137
Cal. Rptr. 512, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (Section 3479 is declarative of the common
law); see also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1234 (Cal. 1975) (unless contrary
intent clearly appears, civil code provisions will be construed to embody common-law
decisions).
288 See, e.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1972); Kornoff v.
Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 288 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1955); Hulbert v. California etc. Cement
Co., 118 P. 928 (Cal. 1911); Judson v. L. A. Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581 (Cal. 1910);
Woods v. Johns, 50 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
"" Shields v. Wondries, 316 P.2d 9, 12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
288 [d.
289 [d.
"'" Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr.
596, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Hardin v. Sin Claire 47 P. 363 (Cal. 1896);
Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983».
291 See Ingram v. City of Gridley, 224 P.2d 798, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (quoting
Wigmore, Select Cases on the Law of Torts § 153).
292 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 40 - Nuisance. (ALI 1979).
293 Brown v. Petrolane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554-555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) .
... CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3480 (2004).
... CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3481 (2004).
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cases: "a private nuisance is a civil wrong based on a disturbance of rights in land," as opposed to a public nuisance, which
is dependent "on an interference with the rights of the community at large. m.. In determining whether something is a public
nuisance, the focus is on whether an entire neighborhood or
community, or at least a considerable number of persons, are
affected, and an act or omission to act interferes with that
community's interests, comfort, convenience, or health.297 Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) defines a public nuisance
as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public. m98 Thus, under the Restatement (Second), liability is precluded specifically, and only, for injuries to individuals
not exercising a public right, and for reasonable interference
with such rights. 299
Petroleum pollution at times involves the use of property
in a way that harms the property interests of others, so a private-nuisance claim may be appropriate in some situations.
More commonly, however, the facts of petro litigation clearly
involve the public-nuisance criteria of "anything, which is injurious to health" and "the comfortable enjoyment of life or property" affecting "at the same time an entire community.'>3°O Further, California's public-nuisance statute and the Restatement's
296

Petroiane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 554-555 (citing Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) at

p.594).
297 See Eaton v. Klimm, 18 P.2d 678, 680 (Cal. 1933); Venuto v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354-355 (Cal. 1971); Biber v. O'Brien 32 P.2d 425,
427-428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934).
298 The history of the public-nuisance approach embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which most states follow, indicates that pollution is at the heart of
public nuisance liability. David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 53. "Pollution may be
a crime against God and nature ... by putting in that defmition we make it impossible
to reach the problem of the black cloud of filth which hangs over my community and, I
suspect yours." Presentation of Restatement of Law, Second, Torts, Tentative Draft No.
16, A.L.I. Proc. 287, 291 (remarks of John P. Frank). This statement was made in
reaction to a proposed version of the Restatement's public nuisance. It reflected the
sentiment which resulted in the present version of the definition, specifically adopted
to address the issues of air, water and land pollution. J.H. Baker, American Introduction to English Legal History, 352 (2d ed. 1979); Janet Loengard, The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of American Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144, 145-49
(1978). Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 807.
299 To sustain damages (as opposed to injunctive relieD for a public nuisance,
however, a private party must also prove special injury, see discussion infra, notes 317341.
"'" Washington. v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (declaring "air
pollution is, of course, one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in modern
experience. "
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definition are general enough to include as the cause of interference the producing, marketing, and distributing of products.
The first critical element in any public-nuisance suit,
which appears to be easily satisfied by petro litigants, is not
that it affects large numbers of people, but that it invades
rights that are common to members of the general public. 301 As
quoted in a recent California case, Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) identifies five "categories of 'public rights,' the
unreasonable interference with which may constitute a public
nuisance: the public health, the public safety, the public peace,
the public comfort or the public convenience."30. Petro litigants
could assert claims based on interference with each of these
rights. The enjoyment of the natural environment is probably
included within the right to public comfort, peace, and health.S03
The right to be free from injury and disease, from contaminated
groundwater, and from smog appears to be encompassed within
all five recognized public rights. so.
Of course, not every interference with a common public
right constitutes a public nuisance. Petro litigants seeking to
press a common-law tort claim for public nuisance must show
the interference is both substantial and unreasonable:05 California courts follow the approach of the Restatement (Second) to
determine what meets this level of interference. 806 The requirement of substantiality is formulated as proof of "significant harm," defined as a "real and appreciable invasion of the
plaintiff's interests," one that is "definitely offensive, seriously
annoying or intolerable. m07 An objective measure is applied: "If
normal people in that locality would not be substantially an301 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3480 (2004) and CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (2004); see also
Kenneth A. Manaster & Daniel P. Selmi, California Environmental Law and Land Use
Practice § 1.01 (1991).
302 People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604-605 (Cal. 1997) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, subd. (2)(a».
303 See, e.g., David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 53; see also Bruce Ledewitz &
Robert D. Taylor, Law and the Coming Environmental Catastrophe, 21 WM. & MARy
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 599, 614 (1997); and nlinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05
(1972).
304 See discussion supra Section II.
"'" People ex rel. Gallo, 929 P.2d at 604-605.
306 Id.
307 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, cmts. c & d; Shields v. Wondries,
316 P.2d 9, 12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). Prosser, Torts 389; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 822. Prosser, Torts 411 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
826-31.
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noyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a
significant one. m08 The unreasonableness of an interference is a
judgment taking into account a handful of factors to decide if
the gravity of harm it inflicts is outweighed by the social utility
of the situation. 309 Once again, objectivity is sought: "The question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion
unreasonable, but 'whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would
consider it unreasonable.">310
Petro defendants may argue that the harm to the public's
health and environmental pollution caused by use of petroleum
products would not disturb a normal person, and their product's social value outweighs the small amount of harm inflicted.
As a counterargument, petro plaintiffs could argue that the
factors in Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct reaches a level of
unreasonable interference. Courts use the three factors described in the Section 821B to determine whether a particular
interference is "unreasonable":
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference
with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance
or administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the
public right. (emphasis added).311

Arguably producing, manufacturing, and distributing
products that, as designed, create smog and other air pollution
in areas of common public use are significant interferences

308

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, com. d.

309

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826-831; San Diego Gas & Electric Co.

v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696-697 (Cal. 1996).
310 San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 920 P.2d at 696-697 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, com. c).
311 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B; In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr.
3d 659, 679 (Cal. App. 2005).
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with the public health, peace, comfort and safety.312 Since the
1950s the conduct creating public health harms has occurred
and it continues at an ever-growing pace, so it probably also
satisfies the long-lasting effect factor.313 The same conduct is
responsible for the hole in the ozone layer and climate change,
which also arguably significantly interfere with the public
health and public peace. 31' The majority of the scientific community could support the position that both interferences satisfy any definition of long-Iasting. 3Is Furthermore, it may be
possible to argue that death, illness, and a hole in the atmosphere so significantly affect the public and that no social value
could outweigh them, especially as the defendants have the
capability to sell alternative designs that do not cause these
harms. Thus, nuisance laws' availability for a suit by petro
plaintiffs may be particularly apt in the present era, as alternative sources are now ready to be used. In sum, if proof of the
harms caused by the use of petroleum fuel and ICEs satisfies
California's causation standards, the court might easily find
the petro defendants' conduct involves interferences both substantial and unreasonable.316
The third critical element of a public-nuisance suit against
the petro industry, for both government entities and private
citizens, is to establish standing. Abatement of a public nuisance was ordinarily the business of the sovereign, acting
through its law officers. 317 A private person now has standing
to bring a public nuisance if he or she has suffered not only
special injury, but also damage different in kind-rather than
in degree-from that shared by the general public. 318 A private
petro plaintiff who sufficiently alleges such special injury can
seek relief in the form of damages and an injunction. 31"
Supreme Court precedent granting Georgia parens patriae
standing for an injunction to abate a permanent nuisance from

312

See discussion supra Section II.

313 See id.
31. David Grossman, supra note 120, at 54.
Id. See supra notes 53-100 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 188-228 and accompanying text.
317 CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 3491, 3494; see California Oregon Power Co. v. Superior
Court, 291 P.2d 455, 463 (Cal. 1955).
318 CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 3480, 3493 (2004); Reynolds v. Presidio R. R. Co., 81 P.
1118-1119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905); see Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) at pp. 608-609.
319 Fisher v. Zumwalt, 61 P. 82 (Cal. 1900).
315

316

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss3/8

50

Lipanovich: Smoke Before Oil

2005]

SMOKE BEFORE OIL

479

noxious gases from copper mines was applied by the Ninth Circuit in an antitrust claim regarding automobile pollution. 320
The Supreme Court found Georgia had standing to sue for injury to forests, crops, orchards, and other losses, even though
the majority of the harm occurred to private property.32l The
Ninth Circuit followed this decision when it found government
entities and crop farmers had standing to seek an injunction to
stop an alleged horizontal conspiracy from eliminating competition in the production of automotive anti-pollution control
devices.322 Since the original action warranting this type of
standing was based on Supreme Court precedent set in a public
nuisance case, the Ninth Circuit's decision suggests this precedent might similarly permit standing in a public-nuisance suit
regarding automobile pollution.
Courts have noted that a 1905 amendment to California
Code of Civil Procedure. Section 731 was purposely adopted to
empower district attorneys and city attorneys to institute civil
actions for the abatement of public nuisances in counties and
cities, and to compel them to do so when directed by the legislative authorities of counties and cities. 323 This bolsters the argument that California's Attorney General should bring a public-nuisance suit against the petro industry. Since a private
attorney is not allowed to bring a public-nuisance suit in the
absence of special injury, and the legislature specifically
granted authority to government entities to bring publicnuisance suits, public policy indicates that government entities
should do so if public rights are being infringed. 32' Otherwise,
320 Ga. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907) (Court granted
state's claim for an injunction, on behalf of mainly private citizen property owners, to
enjoin defendant copper mines from discharging noxious gases.); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973).
321 Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237-38.
322 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d at 13l.
323 Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co., 164 P. 1119, 1120-1121 (Cal. 1917). CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 731 states, "An action may be brought by any person whose property is
injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance ... A civil
action may be brought in the name of the people of the State of California to abate a
public nuisance ... by the district attorney of any county in which such nuisance exists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which such nuisance exists ... and
such district attorney, or city attorney, of any county or city in which such nuisance
exists must bring such action whenever directed by the board of supervisors of such
county or whenever directed by the legislative authority of such town or city."
324 See, e.g., People ex reI. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985)
(holding in a public nuisance abatement action, it was improper, under CAL. CODE elV.
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areas of bad air pollution would essentially be zones of sacrifice. Further, the state's willingness to bring such a suit is indicated by the recent case brought last summer against five
major power producers for their contribution to global warming. 325
Private petro plaintiffs must carefully plan and choose
their plaintiff groups and the type of special injury to have
standing in a public-nuisance suit. In Diamond, the court
compared special-injury claims of property and health damage
caused by petroleum pollution to properly pled special-injury
claims from the common-law categories of "dust, smoke and
odors.!!326 The court, however, held the size of the plaintiff class
(over seven million), the diversity of the interests, and the multiplicity of the issues would make the proceeding unmanageable-essentially the class was so large it arguably was the
public. 327 Also, while proximity to a nuisance may make some
plaintiffs suffer greater injury or aggravation of health problems than those suffered by more remote plaintiffs, a finding of
injury different in kind is unlikely.32B Allegations of aggravated
respiratory disorders, general allergies, and allergy to specific
chemicals have all been found different "in degree," not "in
kind" from those suffered by the surrounding community.329
This is largely because the standard for nuisance liability is
that of a "normal person of ordinary sensibilities in the community.''S30 Fear due to proximity to jet fuel storage tanks at an
airport and to pollution from a refinery have also been held not
to be different in kind from effects on other individuals in the
community.331
PROC. § 731, for the action to be brought in the name of a private attorney hired by a
city to bring the action, instead of bringing the action in the name of the city attorney.).
32S Eight States File Global Warming Lawsuit Against Polluters, THE DAILY
RECORD OF ROCHESTER, July 23,2004.
326 Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-643 and n.5 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971). (It is assumed from the context of note 5 that when the court wrote "private nuisance" it intended to refer to a "private action" in a "public nuisance.")
327 [d.
326 Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350,356-357 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971); Baker v. Burbank-Pasadena Airport Authority, 270 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Cal. Ct.
App.1970).
329 Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 356-357.
330 [d.
331 Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Brown v. Petrolane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
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A survey of California cases indicates a finding of special
injury often requires extreme or multiple facts acting concurrently to reach some sort of reprehensible conduct. 332 For example, "trauma resulting from an assault with a gun," gun shot
wounds, and both "specific and direct physical and emotional
injuries by the shock to [a person's] nervous system upon" witnessing the shooting have been held sufficient. 333 So has the
death of a two-year old drowned in a hole filled with water in
an improperly maintained flood channe1. 334 In another case, it
was sufficient that the plaintiffs alleged a multitude of interferences by the operation of a laundry, such as "noises, odors,
blocking of sidewalks, soot and grease deposits," and ill
health. 330 Likewise, proximity of some plaintiffs to a source of
pollution may reach the level of an injury different in kind from
that suffered by others, if the pollution not only leaves deposits
on the land of nearby plaintiffs but also deprives them of comfortable use and enjoyment of their homes and is deleterious to
their health; or if smoke, odor, and noise all combine to disturb
them both in the comfortable enjoyment of their property and
in their occupations. 33G While what amounts to "different in
kind" clearly is fact-specific, the broadness of the standard, and
the variety of the harms caused by petroleum pollution, leaves
a myriad of claims open to the creative petro plaintiff.
Farmers with children in areas with high amounts of traffic may be an ideal plaintiff group. Children are especially
vulnerable to health harms caused by petro emissions.337
Stormwater runoff carries exhaust contaminants into farmers'
fields. 338 Decreased productivity from local air pollution causes
diminished crop yields and would constitute injury to commercial interests. If farm families sue for all of these interferences
with their rights, their combined injuries would likely be suffi-

332 LexisNexis search on December 6, 2004, see summary infra notes 333-336 and
accompanying text.
333 Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (2003).
334 Buchanan v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 128 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976).
335 Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 259 P. 484, 485-486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927).
336 Judson v. L.A. Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581 (Cal. 1910); Lind v. City of San
Luis Obispo, 42 P. 437 (Cal. 1895).
337 See supra, Section II. I.
338 [d.
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cient for standing to assert a claim of public nuisance. 339 Standing was found for crop farmers in 1973 under an antitrust statute, when plaintiff farmers sued automobile manufacturers for
injury to their crops allegedly caused by a conspiracy to reduce
motor vehicle air pollution research and to retard the development of anti-pollution equipment. 34o Some private groups may
also be able to allege special injury on behalf of their members,
such as nonprofits like environmental organizations and the
American Lung Association. 341
a.

Public Nuisance Liability in a Mass Products Tort

This last century of industrial boom not only produced
products liability, but it also spawned nuisance suits against
product manufacturers. 34' Interestingly, the first suits including nuisance claims against product manufacturers occurred in
the 1970's against motor vehicle manufacturers. 343 In fact, a
California court issued probably the first published opinion on
public nuisance against a product manufacturer for claims for
personal injury and property damage caused by pollution from
motor vehicles. 344 The court stated that the dismissal did not
bar other "similar class action nuisance claims appropriately
framed," which implies that a California court may accept some
form of a nuisance action concerning petro products."'5 Still,
this implication is untested.
339

See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir.

1973).
3<0 Id. (In antitrust suit court held farmers satisfied first requisite of standing
under Clayton Act section 4 for allegation of injury to "business or property" from defendant's conspiracy to eliminate anti-pollution devices.).
th
341 See Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 971 (9
Cir. 2001) (pro se plaintiff, in averring that his respiratory discomfort will be aggravated by emissions from developments
on former federal lands, asserts an injury that is sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy standing); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 176
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "the Residents have alleged concrete and particularized
injury in the form of increased traffic, pollution, and noise"); Sierra Club v. EPA, 129
F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that interest in being free from increased auto
emissions conferred standing).
342 See id.
343 Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972); Diamond v. General
Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
344 Donald Gifford, supra note 281, at 750 (referring to Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
641) .
... Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 641-643 and n. 5. It is assumed by context that
when the court wrote "private nuisance" in footnote 5 it intended to refer to a "private
action" in a "public nuisance."
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Nuisance claims truly burst upon the mass products tort
scene in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s.
Similar claims
have subsequently been brought against manufacturers of
handguns, genetically modified seed corn, methyl-tertiary butyl
ether (MTBE is a gasoline additive), lead paint, and herbiCourts in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois have all held
cides.
manufacturers liable for nuisance related to their products beyond the point of sale. s4s Many of the public-nuisance claims
upheld against product manufacturers have occurred within
the last five years.
Some arguments have been made that
this expansion of nuisance law to product manufacturers is unsupported by the historical origins of the tort. 350 However,
based on the prevalence of such suits, the counterargument-that tort law, and for that matter American jurisprudence, is a
creature ofhistory--seems to be prevailing.
Some California cases appear to make product manufacturers' liability under nuisance law dependent upon the accompaniment of some activity by the manufacturer beyond the
normal behavior associated with the manufacture, distribution,
346

347

34

•

... Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 745-47.
In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(refusing to dismiss nuisance claims against distributor of genetically modified seed
corn that allegedly "contaminated the entire corn supply of the United States"); In Re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12192, (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 2001) (court allowed public nuisance claim against oil companies for MTBE); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(court allowed public nuisance claim against firearm manufactures and denied motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action); Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1(111.
App. Ct. 2001) (court denied motion to dismiss and allowed public nuisance claim
against rrrearm manufacturers); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson, 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 352 (Mass. Super Ct. filed July 13, 2000) (slip op.) (refusing to dismiss public
nuisance claims at pleading stage against firearms manufacturers); New York v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (court held that whether
defendant herbicide manufacturer's product was a public nuisance was a factual question); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (court
allowed public nuisance claim against firearm manufacturers and denied motion to
dismiss for failure to state cause of action); Whitehouse v. Lead Industrial Association,
2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 2001) (court held public nuisance claim factually sufficiently alleged against lead pigment manufacturers and their trade associations) .
... Young v. Bryco Arms, 327 Ill. App. 3d 948 (Ill. App. 1at Dist. 2001); Northridge
Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 205 Wis. 2d 267 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1996); Page County Appliance
Center, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1984).
34. See supra notes 347-348; see also In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F.
Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio
2000); Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Johnson v. Arms, 304 F.
Supp. 2d 383 (E.D. N.Y. 2004); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d
1136 (Ohio 2002).
,.., Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 775.
347
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and supplying of the product. 351 This has been held to be satisfied, for example, if the defendant manufacturer's equipment is
designed to discharge waste in a manner that will create a nuisance. 352 In contrast, this requirement is not satisfied by merely
putting an allegedly defective product into the stream of commerce."53 This subtle difference distinguishes liability for affirmative steps like providing specific instructions to an unsuspecting user, but not for failure to warn."5' Thus, a petro plaintiff may be able to bring a nuisance action against petro product manufacturers, but the plaintiff must allege something
more than that the products had a defect that caused a nuisance by entering the stream of commerce:55 Alleging that the
products were designed to discharge toxins in a manner that
will create a nuisance may likely be sufficient. 356 Another possibility is alleging that petro manufacturers purposefully
dominated the market, creating a system in which other alternative sources of transport were unavailable to consumers.
This creation of a market nuisance theory may be comparable
to the nuisance actions courts have allowed against gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers, on the theory that in targeting illegal gun purchasers the market they created was a
public nuisance. 357
b.

Proving Defendant's Exclusive Control

Whether California nuisance law requires a special relationship demonstrating defendant's control over the instrument
SOl lleto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211, fn. 26 (9th Cir. 2003); City of Modesto
Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court of San Francisco County, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d
865, 875-876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
302 City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 875-876 (The court
held a party is liable under common law nuisance for "manufacturing a system designed to dispose of dry cleaning solvent wastes improperly or by instructing users of
its products to dispose of wastes improperly," but not liable for merely placing "solvents
in the stream of commerce without warning adequately of the dangers of improper
disposal. ").
303 Id.
"'Id.
3MId.
aMId.
307 See, e.g., lleto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); Gary ex. reI. King v.
Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416 (2002); Johnson v. Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D. N.Y.
2004).
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causing the nuisance appears uncertain:58 Proximate cause in
California does not contain a control requirement; the defendant's act or omission simply must be a substantial factor in
causing the harm.359 This would lead to an analysis similar to
that undertaken in determining causation. 3Bo In the context of
nuisances, for instance, it has been held that it is not fatal to a
plaintiff's claim under California law concerning handguns if
the defendant manufacturer did not control the product at the
moment the harm occurred. 3BI A defendant's "control of the
creation and supply of an illegal secondary market for firearms" has been held to be a sufficiently substantial factor to
hold the defendant liable for a person using a gun to shoot
someone. 3B2 One California case recently stated "liability for
nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance: the critical question is whether the
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.'>363
On the other hand, if a court found California nuisance law
has a control requirement, factors identified in support of rejecting claims on these grounds suggest a petro plaintiff's case
would still pass muster.3" It has been noted as significant by
courts denying nuisance claims against asbestos manufacturers that the defendants no longer controlled the asbestos products and thus lacked the legal right to abate the asbestos hazards because "ownership and control lie exclusively with the
plaintiffs.mB5 However, petro defendants need not remain in
control of their vehicles or petroleum fuel in order to abate tailpipe emissions because they can prospectively redesign their
products. Furthermore, arguably a special relationship between the petro defendant and plaintiff exists, as it is foreseeable upon selling a product the buyer will use it .
... Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003).
359

[d.

See discussion supra Section III.B.3.a.
[leta, 349 F.3d at 1213 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 768
N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002)).
362 [d.
363 City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d
865,871-872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Newhall Land & Fanning Co. v. Superior
360
361

Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377,381-382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993».
364

Detroit Bd. of Ed. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513,522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).

,.. [d.
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Remedies for a Public-Nuisance Claim in California

All the elements of a common-law public-nuisance action
could be satisfied by petro plaintiffs, and the law seems well
suited to accommodate petro litigation. Operation of a business
in accord with government permission and regulation does not
justify the continuance of a nuisance. 366 The fact that other
sources of similar discomforts to the plaintiff exist in the community is no defense to a plaintiffs action for public nuisance. 367
And "the adoption of the most approved appliances and methods of production [does not] justify the continuance of that
which, in spite of them, remains a nuisance.'>368 While the statute of limitations may be pleaded in some cases as a limitation
on liability, it is not a defense to a continuing nuisance, since
the character of the nuisance gives rise to successive rights of
action. 369 In the tobacco litigation, state recoupment actions,
including public-nuisance claims, allowed states to pursue such
actions because some states are exempt from the statute of
limitations and in those that are not, alleging a continuing
harm kept the statute from running.370
Remedies for actions arising out of a nuisance depend upon
whether the nuisance is permanent or continuing. 371 If a nuisance is permanent, then Code of Civil Procedure Section
338(b) requires the plaintiff to "bring one action for all past,
present and future damage within the three years after the
permanent nuisance is erected ... damages are not dependent
upon any subsequent use of the property but are complete
when the nuisance comes into existence."37' If, on the other
hand, the nuisance is continuing, then every repetition of the
continuing nuisance is a distinct wrong, subject to a new and
separate limitation period, so the person injured can bring successive actions until the nuisance is abated, even if the original
Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 259 P. 484, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927).
Judson v. L.A. Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581, 582 (Cal. 1910).
368 [d. at 583.
369 Blue Bird Laundry Co., 259 P. at 486-487.
370 Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 788.
371 Louis C. Klein, Note and Comment: California's Nuisance Laws and Petroleum
Underground Storage Tank Contamination: Will the Ten-Year Statute of Limitations
for Construction Defects Change the Playing Field? 17 WID'ITIER L. REV. 107, 125
(1995).
372 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 870 (Cal.
1985).
366
367
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claim is barred;373 however, recovery is limited to actual injury
suffered within the three years prior to commencement of each
action and prospective damages are unavailable. 3u
The great weight of California authority has articulated
the basic distinction between permanent and continuing nuisances in broad terms of whether the nuisance can be discontinued, or abated, "at any time."37. The nuisance is continuing if
it may be discontinued at any time. 376 Court of appeal opinions
have explicitly or implicitly recognized that "[m]ost cases ...
analyze the condition to determine whether the nUIsance/trespass may be discontinued."377
Modem courts have cited Judge Traynor's opmlOn in a
1952 case to explain California's rationale behind these distinctions and how courts are to derive these distinctions in cases: 378
[I]t has been recognized that in doubtful cases the plaintiff
should have an election to treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. If the defendant is not privileged to continue
the nuisance and is able to abate it, he cannot complain if the
plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as damages accrue
until abatement takes place. On the other hand, if it appears
improbable as a practical matter that the nuisance can or will
be abated, the plaintiff should not be left to the troublesome
remedy of successive actions. 379

Petro defendant liability would likely not be reduced by the
fact that courts, presumably mindful of the genesis of permanent nuisance as a practical exception to a preferred rule, have
maintained a preference for fmding a continuing nuisance. 38o
This both protects the plaintiff from "contingencies" such as
373 Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-627 (Cal. 1945).
374 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870; Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
"5 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870; Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627-628 (Cal.
1952); Phillips v. Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-627 (Cal. 1945); Kafka v. Bozio, 218 P.
753,755-756 (Cal. 1923).
376 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870; Spaulding, 239 P.2d at 627-628; Kafka, 218 P. at 755756; Phillips, 162 P.2d at 626-627.
377 Spar v. Pacific Bell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 482-483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Mangini,
281 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (concluding complaint could be amended to meet either rubric).
378 Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(citing Justice Traynor's opinion in Spaulding, 239 P.2d 625).
379 Id.
380 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870 (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749
(1947»; Baker, 705 P.2d at 872; Kafka, 218 P. at 756.
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unforeseen future injury and the statute of limitations itself
and encourages abatement of nuisances. 3sl Also, the courts
have consistently adhered to the rule that in a case in which
the distinction between permanent and continuing nuisance is
close or doubtful, the plaintiff will be permitted to elect which
theory to pursue. SS2 A sizable damage award is thus very possible under petro plaintiffs' claim for petroleum industry liability
based on public-nuisance theory.
IV. CONCLUSION

"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system,"
wrote Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932, "that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." It was California that
demanded clean cars when Washington, D.C., would not. 383 It
can be California that makes petroleum fuel and ICE manufacturers liable for the harm they cause, when others will not. It
is in fact remarkable that no legal effort has yet focused common-law tort liability on one of the most pervasive sources of
pollution on the planet. 384
In particular, alleging petroleum fuel is a defective product
and a nuisance is novel, yet its exemption in California from
the CAA and its questionable need in the face of alternative
fuels such as hydrogen make liability imminent. 385 Consumers
suffer from greedy stereotypes as they buy SUVs to feel safe
and comfortable, yet fuel-efficient large vehicles are unavailable386 The alternative to a petroleum-driven society is a world
as clean as a smokeless room. The governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, recently converted his Hummer to run
on hydrogen fuel, demonstrating that the utility and bodies of
vehicles do not have to change to allow for a more ethical life,

381 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870 (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749
(1947»; Baker, 705 P.2d at 872; Kafka, 218 P. at 756.
382 See, e.g., Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 839; Baker, 705 P.2d at 870.
383 Carl
Pope, States Abhor a Vacuum, SIERRA MAGAZINE, available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierral200407Iways.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) .
... See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
38S See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
386 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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just two key components: ICEs and petroleum fue1. 387 The feasibility of petro tort litigation and its absence in a society suffering so many harms from the use of petro products pose ethical questions for this era concerning this and future generations.
ANGELA LIPANOVICH*

387 Dan Lienert, Vehicle of the Week: Arnold's Hydrogen Hummer, Forbes.com,
http://www.forbes.coml2005/01l04/cx_dL0104vow_print.html. (last visited Feb. 1,
2005) .
• J.D., Candidate, 2006, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
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